Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic by Pushaw, Robert J.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 84
Issue 5 Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure Article 3
7-1-2009
Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is
the Court Being Courageous or Politically
Pragmatic
Robert J. Pushaw
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Pushaw, Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic, 84 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1975 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol84/iss5/3
CREATING LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS:
IS THE COURT BEING COURAGEOUS
OR POLITICALLY PRAGMATIC?
Robert J Pushaw, Jr.*
Boumediene v. Bush1 continued the Supreme Court's quixotic
quest to establish legal guidelines for the War on Terrorism, which
George Bush waged-with the support of Congress-after al Qaeda's
attacks of September 11, 2001.2 A majority ofJustices began their bat-
tle against the political branches five years ago in a pair of cases.
First, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 invalidated the government's indefinite
detention of "enemy combatants" (i.e., those who had engaged in
armed conflict against the United States) who were American citi-
zens. 4 The Court ruled that they had due process rights to notice and
a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker, which might include a
military tribunal. 5
Second, Rasul v. Bush6 concerned the President's decision to
imprison alien enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which
he had made in reliance upon entrenched precedent construing the
federal habeas corpus statute as not extending jurisdiction to foreign-
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1 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. V 2005)) (empowering the Presi-
dent to employ "all necessary and appropriate force" against those responsible for
these assaults); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution,
Pub.L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (Oct. 16, 2002).
3 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
4 Id. at 509-39.
5 See id. at 509, 524-39.
6 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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ers captured and confined abroad. 7 The Court creatively reinter-
preted this statute to allow the Guantanamo detainees to file habeas
petitions and purported to distinguish its previous contrary cases. 8
In consultation with the executive branch, Congress swiftly
responded by clarifying that its habeas law did not give any federal
court jurisdiction over aliens incarcerated at Guantanamo (thereby
overturning Rasul) and by establishing instead for these prisoners a
multilayered process of military justice followed by federal judicial
review.9 Seeming to defy Congress, five Justices in Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld'0 held that it had not repealed the Court's appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving foreign enemy combatants or authorized their
trial by military commissions.'1 Once again, Congress quickly made
crystal clear that it had indeed intended to (1) deprive all federal
courts (including the Supreme Court) ofjurisdiction over habeas peti-
tions from such detainees, and (2) empower the President to try them
by military tribunals. 12
Undaunted, the same five Justices who had formed the Hamdan
majority recently reached the unprecedented conclusion in
Boumediene v. Bush that the Constitution's writ of habeas corpus may
be invoked by noncitizen enemy combatants who have been appre-
hended and detained outside of the United States' sovereign terri-
tory.' 3 Accordingly, the Court struck down Congress's procedures for
such detainees as a suspension of the constitutional habeas writ and as
inadequate to protect due process rights.1 4
Legal scholars and pundits, who almost uniformly loathe George
Bush and thus applauded the Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan decisions,
praised the Boumediene Court for its "courage" in upholding individual
liberties and the "rule of law"'15 against the assertedly unparalleled
7 See id. at 488-506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (setting forth this traditional under-
standing of the habeas statute).
8 See id. at 473-85 (majority opinion).
9 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119
Stat. 2739 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
10 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
11 See id. at 566-95.
12 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat.
2600, 2635 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)).
13 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
14 Id. at 2274.
15 See, e.g., David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and
Guantanamo Bay, 2007-2008 CATO SuP. CT. REV. 47, 47, 50-52; Jack M. Balkin, Two
Takes: With Boumediene, the Court Reaffirmed a Basic Principle, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REp., June 19, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/06/19/two-
takes-with-boumediene-the-court-reaffirmed-a-basic-principle.html; Erwin Chemerin-
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misconduct of the Bush administration, which had suffered another
stunning "rebuke" that would force it to make significant policy
changes. 16 Such claims seem implausible, for several reasons.
For one thing, the current Justices in general are not particularly
bold or hell-bent on expansively protecting individual rights, espe-
cially as compared to their predecessors on the Warren and early Bur-
ger Courts. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have shown far
greater restraint by: (1) cutting their annual docket in half; (2) fre-
quently deciding cases on the narrowest possible grounds, thereby
leaving many legal questions open and amenable to further demo-
cratic deliberation; and (3) refraining from creating far-reaching con-
stitutional rights. 17 The "enemy combatant" cases depart from this
cautious approach.
Moreover, the Court hardly promotes the rule of law by disingen-
uously "interpreting" statutes to mean the opposite of what they
plainly say (as in Rasul and Hamdan), inventing new constitutional
doctrines (as in Boumediene), and ignoring or distorting its precedent
(as in all three cases). On the contrary, the rule of law presupposes
that judges will impartially apply the written legal rules contained in
the Constitution, statutes, and cases. 8
Finally, the Court's repeated stern reprimands of President Bush
and Congress had little real-world impact on their antiterrorism poli-
cies, which were not nearly as offensive as measures taken during pre-
vious wars. 19 Although the President and Congress always expressed
sky, Kennedy Key to Supreme Court, SAN DIEGO SOURCE, Aug. 22, 2008, http://www.sddt.
com/Reports/article.cfm?RID=642&SourceCode=20080822tbb; Ronald Dworkin,
Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Aug. 14, 2006, at 18, 20.
16 Jonathan Mahler, Why This Court Keeps Rebuking This President, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2008, at WK 3 (citing statements by Neal Katyal and Geoffrey Stone).
17 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (2001). This trend has continued after ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
death in 2005. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist: ChiefJustice Roberts Favors Narrow
Court Rulings that Create Consensus and Tolerate Diversity, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at
BI 1.
18 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 403-07, 413, 417-18, 422-27 (1996) (examining
the evolution and purpose of the rule of law).
19 For example, Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ of habeas corpus, defied
the Chief Justice's order declaring this suspension unconstitutional, appointed mili-
tary commissions to try (and sometimes execute) accused war criminals, seized private
property, and banned "disloyal" speech and publications. See infra notes 56-73 and
accompanying text. Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt created military tribunals that
imposed death sentences on our enemies (including an American citizen) who had
swiftly been convicted of war crimes, forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of Jap-
anese American civilians, and took over several private factories-all with the Court's
1977
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respect for the Court, they did not implement the radical changes it
likely hoped to spur.
In short, I am skeptical of the conventional wisdom that a
uniquely brave Supreme Court, motivated by its steadfast commitment
to the rule of law, successfully foiled the military policies of a singu-
larly evil President and his legislative henchmen. Rather, I believe
that five pragmatic Justices, animated by their personal and political
disagreements with the Bush administration, capitalized on the rela-
tively rare opportunity to give a legal lecture to a politically unpopular
(but not especially bellicose) President and Congress at a time when a
national security crisis had safely passed. I predict that when the next
emergency arises (such as another terrorist attack), the Court will
accede to whatever military retaliation the President deems appropri-
ate-and will cite as support the precedent that it was careful to distin-
guish rather than overrule.
blessing. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text. Compared to Lincoln and
Roosevelt, Bush was more restrained in fighting the War on Terrorism.
To be sure, President Bush adopted innovative strategies and tactics to wage a
unique kind of war, in which America's adversaries are not nation-states engaged in
conventional armed conflict that will come to an end, but rather amorphous private
terrorist groups like al Qaeda which attack civilian targets indiscriminately anywhere
in the world in a struggle that may well be permanent. Most notably, Bush asserted
expansive inherent Article II powers to prevent future terrorist acts by engaging in
surveillance (even domestically) to detect and monitor threats to the United States,
indefinitely detaining and coercively interrogating suspected terrorists, trying them by
military commissions, facilitating extraordinary rendition, and preemptively stopping
terrorists (and the nations who harbor them) before an attack is imminent.
Many scholars have decried the exercise of such broad authority, particularly in
the teeth of statutes that limit executive discretion. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JULES
LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007)
(arguing that President Bush's claim of power to take any actions he deemed neces-
sary, and to disregard the ordinary legal rules that restrict the application of coercive
preventive measures, has undermined the rule of law, liberty, and national security);
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689
(2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief Part 1] (analyzing the
Constitution's text in light of its drafting and ratification history to conclude that the
President must obey congressional restrictions on his war powers, except laws that
interfere with his supervision of the military chain of command); David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History,
121 HARv. L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief
Part 1] (amplifying this thesis based on post-Founding evidence).
In aggressively responding to the attacks of September 11, the Bush administra-
tion made many mistakes. Nonetheless, it achieved its overarching goal of prevent-
ing another terrorist assault, while avoiding many of the more egregious actions taken
by other Presidents.
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I base the foregoing conclusions on recurrent historical patterns,
which reveal a flexible and politically sensitive approach to reviewing
cases involving military affairs. 20 The Court has never entertained gen-
eral claims that the formulation or implementation of military policy
exceeded the powers of Congress under Article I or the President
under Article II. More specific complaints that the exercise of war pow-
ers violated someone's individual legal rights have been judicially
reviewed, but with far more deference to the government than in the
domestic sphere.
The degree of deference, however, has depended upon the fac-
tual, legal, and political context of each case. The Court's discretion
has been guided primarily by four interrelated factors: (1) the serious-
ness of the military crisis and the necessity for the President's respon-
sive action; (2) whether or not Congress approved the President's
conduct; (3) the egregiousness of the alleged violation of individual
rights; and (4) the President's political strength, which if high enough
might lead him to ignore a court order to desist from an action he has
determined is essential to win a war whose outcome hangs in the bal-
ance. This last consideration is never publicly articulated but none-
theless can be crucial.
Application of these factors has always led the Court to decline to
challenge politically powerful Presidents like Abraham Lincoln and
Franklin Roosevelt who, with Congress's backing, addressed perilous
national security threats-regardless of the individual rights at stake.21
Even in less dire circumstances, however, the Justices usually have
deferred to the President's judgment.22 The Court has struck down
war measures only in a few cases when a very unpopular President,
such as Andrew Johnson or Harry Truman, unilaterally took a step
that the Court found to be disproportionately drastic, invasive of fun-
damental legal rights, and unnecessary because the military crisis had
ended.23
20 The ideas in this paragraph will be fleshed out in Part I.B. For a summary and
analysis of the Court's jurisprudence, see RobertJ. Pushaw,Jr., The "Enemy Combatant"
Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1005, 1005-16, 1024-47 (2007).
21 See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text (discussing numerous cases aris-
ing out of the Civil War and World War II).
22 Most pertinently here, after the cataclysmic Second World War had ended, the
Court continued to acquiesce to the President's decision to use military commissions.
See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text (describing decisions rendered
during Reconstruction and the Korean War).
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I predict that Boumediene and the other "enemy combatant" deci-
sions will eventually be grouped in this latter category. The Court
decided these cases when President Bush's approval ratings had hit
historic lows, long after the September 11 emergency had passed and
therefore Bush's continuation of his initial hard-line approach struck
the majority as unnecessary-and inimical to basic liberty interests. 24
The only traditional factor for judicial intervention that has not been
consistently present is the lack of congressional approval. On the one
hand, the majority justified the Rasul and Hamdan holdings largely on
their conclusion that Congress had not authorized President Bush's
action.25 On the other hand, in Hamdi and Boumediene the Court
acknowledged such legislative authorization, yet struck down the Pres-
ident's actions as unconstitutional-a result that had never occurred
before. 26
One possible explanation for the novelty of Hamdi and
Boumediene is that the Court found itself in a historically unique situa-
tion which allowed it to defy both political branches with relative
impunity, for two reasons. 27 First, by 2008 the approval rating of Con-
gress had dropped to twelve percent, even lower than George Bush's
twenty-six percent.28 Second, the Justices who decided Boumediene
knew that there would be a new President elected five months later,
and both candidates had pledged to make major changes in detainee
policy (including possibly shutting down Guantanamo). Thus, the
lame-duck President Bush could not effectively retaliate against the
Court, especially given voters' overriding concern with the sinking
economy. 29 Under these unusual circumstances, it would be a mis-
take to characterize the recent "enemy combatant" cases as heralding
a permanent shift to fearless, aggressive judicial oversight of military
decisions.
24 See infra notes 137-47, 163-65, 224-31, 348-56 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 148-53, 195-99 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 122-29, 136, 239-40, 357-58 and accompanying text.
27 Part III will develop the themes in this paragraph.
28 See David Paul Kuhn, Confidence in Congress at Record Low, POLITICO, June 20,
2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0608/11232.html. The political
branches' poll ratings were a tad higher in 2006, but still quite anemic. See infra note
231 and accompanying text; see also Neal Devins, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy
Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 91 MINN. L. REv,. 1562 (2007) (contending that the Court realized it would
not face a backlash from Congress or the President because of their many political
problems).
29 See Vikas Bajaj, After Big Rally, Grim Outlook Still Looms on Profits and Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, at Al.
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The foregoing ideas will be developed in three parts. Part I will
summarize the Court's pragmatic, case-by-case approach to judicial
review of war powers. Part II will analyze the Court's recent War on
Terrorism decisions, with a special emphasis on Boumediene. Part III
will suggest that these cases eventually will be seen as aberrational, not
a harbinger of a Brave New World of increased judicial micromanage-
ment of military policy. 3 °
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE EXERCISE OF WAR POWERS
A. The Constitutional Scheme
The Constitution does not explicitly mention judicial review,
much less say how it should be exercised in evaluating claims that
Congress or the President acted unconstitutionally in taking war mea-
sures. Nonetheless, many clauses in the Constitution, read in light of
its underlying structure and political theory, suggest that the judiciary
would play an extremely circumscribed role in examining military
actions.
The Constitution's Framers and ratifiers understood that it estab-
lished a heavy presumption favoring judicial review, because only
independent Article III courts could impartially ascertain whether
political officials had observed the written constitutional limits on
their powers and had not transgressed individual legal rights. 31 This
presumption could be rebutted, however, on a showing that particular
constitutional provisions entrust Congress or the President with exclu-
sive and conclusive power to interpret and enforce them.
3 2
30 At the outset, I should make clear that my thesis does not depend on the politi-
cal party or ideology of any particular President or group ofJustices, but rather on the
Court's implicit assessment of the President's political strength and popularity in tak-
ing decisive war measures. Thus, my purpose here is not to defend George Bush's
approach, which had numerous flaws. See infra notes 137-38, 141-45, 230-31, 355-56
and accompanying text.
31 The most famous articulation of this argument is found in THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 524-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). For similar state-
ments by the two leading figures at the framing and ratification conventions, see 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73-74, 78 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS] (James Madison); 2 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
445-46, 480-81, 489 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1891)
[hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (James Wilson). For a detailed analysis of the histori-
cal understanding of how judicial review flows from the Constitution's structure and
political theory, see Pushaw, supra note 18, at 407-35.
32 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 31, at 524-25; see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-66, 170 (1803). For an extensive development
of this theme, see generally RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Ques-
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The latter "political questions" included the making, execution,
and evaluation of military and foreign policy. The Constitution com-
mits these powers solely to Congress and the President, who have the
democratic authority, political incentives, and institutional compe-
tence to protect national security.33 Under Article I, Congress can
provide for the common defense;34 authorize military action (by a
declaration of war or other means); 35 establish, fund, and regulate the
armed forces;36 suspend the writ of habeas corpus "when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it";37 and oversee
the executive branch's conduct of war.38 Article II vests in the Presi-
lion Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1165 (2002).
33 In defending the Constitution's grant of plenary authority to the political
branches, Alexander Hamilton argued:
[War] powers ought to exist without limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee
or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitu-
tional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.
This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of
such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same coun-
cils, which are appointed to preside over the common defence.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 147 (second
emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison), supra note 31, at
270 (stressing that peaceful republics must have all means necessary to defend them-
selves against aggressor nations).
The debates over war powers assumed that they would be exercised exclusively by
elected federal officials, with no judicial interference. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 464-65, 470; THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alex-
ander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 500. For further discussion of these historical
materials, see Pushaw, supra note 18, at 401, 430-31, 507-09; Pushaw, supra note 20,
at 1017-23.
34 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
35 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
36 See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14 (empowering Congress to "raise and support" the
Army, "provide and maintain a Navy," and regulate these forces); id. art. I, § 8, cls.
15-16 (authorizing Congress to organize the militia and to arrange for the President
to call it forth to suppress insurrections and repel invasions).
37 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Although this provision does not expressly say that only
"Congress" can suspend the writ, this conclusion seems clear due to the clause's place-
ment in Article I (which deals with Congress alone) and traditional Anglo-American
practice entrusting this power to legislatures. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 91-92, 101 (1807).
38 Article I's general grant of "legislative power" has always been understood as
incorporating the traditional function of overseeing all executive branch action. See
Pushaw, supra note 18, at 404-05.
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dent all "executive Power"39 (to administer federal statutes, including
those related to the military) and designates him "Commander in
Chief' (to direct the army and navy).40 Moreover, Article II implicitly
39 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
40 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Commander-in-Chief power was "nominally the
same with that of the King of Great-Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral .... while that of the British
King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies; all of which by the Constitution .. .would appertain to the Legislature." See
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 31, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
Several scholars have recently argued that the President's only core and exclusive
constitutional power, which cannot be limited by Congress, is superintending the mil-
itary chain of command (and perhaps defending the nation in an emergency when
Congress is not in session)-not controlling war strategy, tactics, and campaigns. See
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief Part I, supra note 19, at 692-98, 720-804
(supporting this theme with a detailed textual and historical analysis); see alsoJules
Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the
Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008) (reaching a similar conclusion by focusing
on whether the Constitution commits a particular military subject to one branch or
rather to both Congress and the President, to be shared in an overlapping manner).
The Barron/Lederman methodology of distinguishing "core" executive war pow-
ers from "peripheral" ones (with the latter susceptible to congressional restraints)
resembles my analytical model developed in the context of Article III. See RobertJ.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA
L. REv. 735, 738-44, 843-67 (2001) (contending that Congress cannot restrict federal
judges' exercise of pure 'judicial power"-rendering a final judgment after applying
the law to the facts-and implied authority that is indispensable to performing that
function, but that Congress can regulate "beneficial" powers that are merely helpful,
useful, or convenient); see also Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief Part I, supra
note 19, at 727-28 (citing others who have compared executive and judicial
authority).
This analogy to the courts' powers is imperfect, however, because the stakes
involved in the President's exercise of war powers are considerably higher, often liter-
ally a matter of life and death. Thus, I do not believe that the Commander in Chief
must strictly comply with a federal statute governing military operations if he con-
cludes that doing so would imperil national security, because he has an independent
duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and the American people. In
appropriate critical situations, the President can take the military action he deems
essential. Of course, he must later submit to the judgment of the voters and to the
oversight of Congress, which in extreme circumstances can impeach him. Cf Barron
& Lederman, Commander in Chief Part I, supra note 19, at 745-48 (treating skeptically
modern Presidents' claims of Lincoln-like urgent necessity to act unilaterally to pre-
serve the Union because today Congress can reconvene quickly and, in any event, it
has enacted many general statutes pre-authorizing Presidents to address
emergencies).
Furthermore, assuming that Barron and Lederman are correct about history, it is
unclear whether the original constitutional meaning can be implemented today in
light of transformative changes such as: (1) the exponential growth of executive
1983
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allows the President to respond independently to military emergen-
cies 4' because, unlike the multimember and slow-moving legislature
and judiciary, he can take quick and decisive action based on the
advice of his expert subordinates who have access to confidential mili-
tary and foreign intelligence. 42
power over the past century (augmented by technological innovations) and the corre-
sponding reduction in the influence of Congress and its incentives to challenge the
President in military affairs; (2) the presence of a huge standing army that is continu-
ously funded; (3) the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons; (4) the
post-World War II emergence of a secretive national security bureaucracy under the
President's direction; and (5) the courts' general deference to the executive. See
Christopher H. Schroeder, Loaded Dice and Other Problems: A Further Reflection on the
Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1325 (2006). But see Barron & Lederman,
Commander in Chief Part II, supra note 19, at 1098-110 (rejecting the contention that
modem circumstances require jettisoning the traditional constitutional scheme of
congressional control over war powers).
41 The Framers authorized Congress to "declare" rather than "make" war to allow
the President to engage in warmaking for the limited purpose of repelling sudden
attacks. See 2 FARRAND's REcoRDs, supra note 31, at 318-19. Except for this emer-
gency defensive power, the Framers and ratifiers authorized Congress alone to initiate
military hostilities and the President thereafter to command the armed forces, as the
founder of the "originalism" movement demonstrated long ago. See Raoul Berger,
War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 36-54, 82-86 (1972); see also William
Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 7-13 (1972) (to similar effect). America's finest separation-of-
powers scholar recently reaffirmed this conclusion and cited many other distin-
guished academics who shared it, including David Adler, John Hart Ely, Michael
Glennon, Harold Koh, Charles Lofgren, Taylor Reveley, and William Treanor. See
Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND. L.J. 1199,
1200-07 (2006).
Rejecting this orthodoxy, Professor Yoo has argued that the Constitution does
not establish a single process for commencing war, but rather grants Congress and
the President all military powers and permits them to work out the details. SeeJohn
C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996). Thus, Presidents can start and manage armed
conflicts, which Congress can then control through appropriations and impeach-
ment. See id. at 174, 196-97, 218, 241-90, 295-96, 300, 305. In Professor Yoo's opin-
ion, the power of Congress to "declare war" against another nation entails simply a
"juridical" determination that triggers the international laws of war and domestic con-
stitutional military authority. See id. at 204-06, 242-50, 288, 295.
My independent reading of the historical materials leads me to side with the
traditional view. Whatever the original meaning, however, Presidents have long
asserted independent power to use military force to do much more than merely
defend against sudden attacks. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never decided on
the constitutionality of such actions, and likely never will. Therefore, the debate over
which branch can initiate war has little bearing on judicial review of military powers.
42 The Constitution incorporated a separation-of-powers scheme that reflected
these institutional differences, which had their greatest impact in military and foreign
1984 [VOL. 84:5
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Article III does not give the judiciary any role in authorizing or
conducting war. 43 Therefore, challenges to military decisions solely
on the ground that they did not comply with Articles I or II are not
justiciable. 44 The only situation in which judicial intervention might
be appropriate would be where the exercise of war powers allegedly
violated individual legal rights. Unfortunately, nothing in either the
Constitution or its drafting and ratification history explicitly reveals
affairs. See Pushaw, supra note 18, at 400-35 (detailing this framework). Like all legis-
latures, Congress could enact a law only when a majority reached agreement after
protracted discussion, debate, and compromise. See id. at 401, 415-16. Furthermore,
the judiciary moves far more slowly than either political department: courts must wait
until parties commence an action and the litigation process has been completed
before they can render a judgment applying the law to the facts. Id. at 402, 417-18,
421-27.
Consequently, only the executive branch, united in a single President, could act
with the necessary speed and firmness based on access to relevant (and often secret)
information. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 31, at 447 (James Wilson); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 471-73, 476. As Hamilton
put it: "[T] he direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distin-
guish the exercise of power by a single hand. , . . [T] he power of directing and
employing the common strength [in war] ... forms [a] usual and essential part in the
definition of the executive authority." THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 31, at 500. Finally, Congress and the courts are in session for fixed peri-
ods, whereas the President is continuously on duty and hence can immediately
respond to sudden attacks. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 131,
142-43, 204, 351-63 (2005).
43 Chief Justice Jay and his colleagues set an enduring precedent by declining to
give the President requested legal advice on military and foreign policy matters. See
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "DearJohn" Letters: Advisory
Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1998) (reviewing STEWART JAY, MOST
HUMBLE SERVANTS (1997)) (discussing the Justices' refusal in 1793 to answer Washing-
ton's questions about America's neutral status in the European wars that followed the
American Revolution, which became the basis for the judiciary's policy of never ren-
dering legal advice).
44 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Pres-
idential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 22-33 (1970) (arguing that the Constitution
leaves the precise relationship between the legislative and executive branches in exer-
cising war powers to the political rather than judicial process). But see William
Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
695, 768-70 (1997) (contending that courts should not invoke the political question
doctrine to avoid resolving challenges to the President's unilateral commencement of
armed hostilities because Congress lacks the political incentives to oppose the Presi-
dent, who alone might be tempted to achieve immortality by leading the country into
a war against the national interest); cf. Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief Part
I, supra note 19, at 721-25 (maintaining that when the President defies an Act of
Congress, courts should not relegate this dispute to political resolution because doing
so would force Congress to reenact the same statute by a supermajority or resort to
extreme measures like impeachment).
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whether such claims should be dismissed as political questions,
examined through ordinary domestic-style judicial review, or analyzed
through a compromise approach of exercising jurisdiction but show-
ing great deference to the political branches. The Supreme Court
wisely chose the latter course.45
B. Jurisprudence on War Powers
The Marshall Court simultaneously asserted the power of judicial
review while recognizing its inapplicability to the military decisions of
Congress and the President, which generally concerned the nation as
a whole and therefore were subject to scrutiny only through the
national political process. 46 Ever since, the Court has reaffirmed this
"political question" analysis. 47 The only exceptions have arisen in a
45 The Court's deferential approach reflects the Constitution's political and insti-
tutional framework, which gives the judiciary the weakest incentive to address war
powers because it lacks the institutional competence to make sound judgments and
because an incorrect decision thwarting the President might lead to a disaster that
would harm its prestige. Conversely, the President has the strongest interest in mili-
tary affairs and the greatest capacity to handle them. SeeJohn 0. McGinnis, Constitu-
tional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational
Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1993, at 293,
293-94, 305-08, 316-18.
46 SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-66, 176-80 (1803); see also
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28-33 (1827) (refusing to second-guess the
President's determination as Commander in Chief that a possible invasion required
calling forth the militia, which he had made pursuant to explicit congressional
authorization and based upon information that might require confidentiality and that
might not meet judicial standards of admissible evidence); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1,197 (1824) (identifying the power of Congress to declare war as a politi-
cal question); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818) (con-
cluding that courts could not examine congressional judgments about the rights of
foreigners during wartime).
47 For instance, the Taney Court abstained from deciding a claim that Rhode
Island's original government, founded in 1663 under a royal charter, did not have a
"Republican Form of Government" because it had not been established as a result of a
popular convention that established a broadly representative legislature, as had a rival
government. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 34-45 (1849). This conclu-
sion reflected the following facts: (1) both Congress and the President had deter-
mined that the charter government was legitimate; (2) the President, with the
authorization of Congress, had mobilized the militia to suppress the insurgent gov-
ernment; and (3) overruling the political branches' decisions would require invalidat-
ing all of the acts of Rhode Island's government, which would cause chaos. See id. at
38-39, 42-45.
Other cases contain similar analysis. See, e.g., Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 50, 71-77 (1868) (refusing to review the decision of Congress to abolish Geor-
gia's government and impose martial law during Reconstruction); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 3, 10-12 (1973) (interpreting the Constitution as committing military
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few cases in which plaintiffs credibly alleged that a particular exercise
of war powers breached a legal duty in a way that violated their indi-
vidual legal rights.48 Even in these instances, however, the Court typi-
cally has resolved all doubts in favor of the validity of the
government's action. 49 The precise degree of deference, however,
has varied depending upon the facts and political background of each
case. Although the Court's idiosyncratic decisionmaking cannot be
reduced to any simple formula, four factors have been particularly
influential. 50
training and procedures entirely to the political branches, and thus dismissing as non-
justiciable a complaint that negligent training of the National Guard led to the killing
of unarmed antiwar protestors). Three other "political question" decisions will be
examined in greater detail below. SeeThe Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863)
(discussed infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 243 (1864) (analyzed infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (considered infra notes 89-93 and accompanying
text).
48 In the seminal case of Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), the Mar-
shall Court acknowledged the President's vast discretion in directing the military and
his inherent power to meet emergencies, but indicated that Congress in authorizing a
war (here, against France) could specify certain boundaries on the President's con-
duct. Id. at 177-78. Accordingly, the President did not have independent Article II
power to go beyond the explicit legislative directive to seize ships going "to" French
ports by ordering the seizure of all ships going "to" and "from" France. Id. at 176-79.
The Court ruled that an American officer who had captured a Danish ship pursuant
to that defective executive order owed the shipowner damages for violating his legal
rights. See id.; see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814)
(holding that an Act of Congress generally authorizing the President to prosecute the
War of 1812 did not encompass the specific power to seize persons or enemy prop-
erty); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133-35 (1852) (disallowing a mili-
tary officer's seizure of private property during a war because of the lack of either
prior congressional permission or some emergency justification).
As wars increased in magnitude and complexity, the Court backed away from
these precedents and began to interpret general legislative authorizations to the Presi-
dent to wage war as encompassing all powers he deemed necessary to win, including
the seizure of people and goods. See infra notes 56-95 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 56-73, 75-85 and accompanying text (describing the Court's
deference to the wartime decisions of Lincoln and Roosevelt, despite their significant
infringements on constitutional rights and liberties).
50 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and
Wells, 69 Mo. L. REv. 959, 963-68 (2004) (summarizing the Court's application of
these considerations). Several other scholars have noted that the Court has embraced
a flexible approach that allows for delicate judgments about the character of the mili-
tary conflict, the threat it poses to the United States, and the nature of the asserted
legal rights. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L REv. 2047, 2056 (2005); Mark E. Brandon, War
and the American Constitutional Order, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1815, 1833 (2003); see also Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and
1987
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First, the Justices evaluate the severity of the military emergency
and the need for the government's particular retaliatory action. For
instance, the Court has accorded Presidents virtual carte blanche in
dealing with nation-threatening crises, but less leeway in addressing
comparatively smaller conflicts. 5 1
Second, regardless of the magnitude of the military operation,
the Court until 2004 always sustained the President when he acted
with explicit congressional authorization. 52 When the President has
proceeded unilaterally, however, the Court has been more willing to
check him.53
the War on Terror, 120 HARv. L. REV. 2029 (2007) (approving the Court's continued
application in its "enemy combatant" decisions of a common law model of habeas,
whereby the Justices exercise responsible discretion in interpreting constitutional and
statutory provisions-jurisdictional, substantive, and procedural-on a case-by-case
basis and adapting them in light of pragmatic concerns, evolving notions of law (espe-
cially changing constitutional norms), and sensitivity to the relative institutional com-
petence of the three branches).
51 See infra notes 56-114 and accompanying text.
52 In his influential opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), Justice Jackson stressed that where Congress authorizes the President's con-
duct, the strongest presumption of constitutionality arises, rebuttable only on the dif-
ficult showing that the federal government as a whole lacked power. Id. at 635-37
(Jackson, J., concurring) (citing numerous decisions upholding the President in this
situation, and none to the contrary). The first case in which the Court acknowledged
that Congress had authorized the President's action, but nonetheless struck it down
as unconstitutional, was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, discussed infra Part II.A.
53 Most famously, the Court rejected Truman's claim that he had the indepen-
dent Article II power to seize and operate domestic steel mills to sustain production
for the Korean War effort. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-89, discussed infra notes
104-13 and accompanying text.
In certain armed conflicts, particularly during America's early years, Congress
often precisely delineated what the President could and could not do. See supra notes
48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's enforcement of these specific
statutory provisions). As wars became more complicated, however, legislative delega-
tions of power tended to become more generalized. A good illustration is Congress's
authorization to the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against
those responsible for the September 11 attacks. See infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
The Court's interpretation of such legislation has been highly subjective. For
example, the Court construed identical statutory language as authorizing the Presi-
dent to create military commissions in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38-40 (1942), but
not in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593-95 (2006). The most logical inference
is that the Court construes generalized statutes as providing authorization when it
seeks to avoid a clash with the President (as with Roosevelt), but as not supplying
authorization when it wants to challenge him (as with Bush).
In short, although the Court has repeatedly identified congressional authoriza-
tion or approval as a critical (often dispositive) factor, its determinations on this score
tend to mask nonlegal considerations. Thus, it is important to look beneath the sur-
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Third, the Justices assess the egregiousness of the alleged inva-
sion of individual legal rights. Unfortunately, this criterion is so pro-
tean that its application amounts to a gut call, as illustrated by the
Court's contradictory conclusions about the procedures owed to
enemy combatants. 54
Fourth, the Court considers the President's political strength-in
particular, whether he enjoys such widespread popular and congres-
sional support in waging a major war that he might ignore a judicial
order that, in his opinion, endangers national security. 55 This calcula-
tion is nakedly political and hence is made sub rosa, but nonetheless
has loomed large in several cases.
The foregoing combination of factors usually leads the Court to
uphold the government's action, but there have been important
exceptions. These cases reveal the heavily discretionary nature ofjudi-
cial review of military decisions.
1. Cases Sustaining the Government's Exercise of War Powers
The Civil War era set enduring precedent for deferring to Presi-
dential actions during wartime. Most notably, in The Prize Cases,56 the
Court sustained Lincoln's April 1861 order, which he had issued on
his own in response to the attack on Fort Sumter, to blockade Confed-
erate ports and seize all offending merchant vessels and their car-
goes-even from shipowners who were unaware of the blockade-
despite their claims of unconstitutional deprivation of their property
without due process. 57 A majority of Justices held that Article II gives
face of seemingly technical statutory interpretations to ascertain what is actually driv-
ing the Court's decision. See Pushaw, supra note 20, at 1012-13.
54 See infra notes 60-63, 75-78, 240, 294-318 and accompanying text. On the
one hand, the President can execute armed enemies (even American citizens) caught
in the United States and swiftly convicted there by his appointed military commission
according to procedures that he hastily devised. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21-23, 48. On
the other hand, the President cannot use military commissions operating under
detailed procedural protections carefully drafted by Congress in noncapital trials of
alien enemy combatants who have been captured and imprisoned outside the United
States. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-77 (2008). The Court has not
explained why killing a citizen by virtual executive fiat is less offensive to due process
than merely trying a foreign accused war criminal in conformance with a multilayered
process approved by Congress.
55 For example, after Abraham Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney's April 1861
order to release a prisoner who had been detained pursuant to the President's uncon-
stitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court deferred to Lincoln for
the remainder of the Civil War. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
56 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
57 See id. at 665-75.
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the President, as Commander in Chief, unreviewable political discre-
tion to determine the appropriate degree of force required by the
crisis, such as the blockade and accompanying deployment of war-
ships.58 Moreover, the absence of congressional preauthorization for
this specific action did not trouble the Court because (1) existing fed-
eral statutes broadly empowered the President to use the military to
suppress domestic insurrections, and (2) Congress remedied any pos-
sible constitutional problems with Lincoln's order by ratifying it retro-
actively.5 9 Similarly, in Ex parte Vallandigham,60 the Court rejected a
due process challenge to a sentence imposed by an army tribunal con-
stituted pursuant to instructions approved by Lincoln.61 The Court
declared that it could not "review or pronounce any opinion upon the
proceedings of a military commission '62 or any other executive
branch wartime judgments. 63
One reason for the Court's surrender was that Lincoln, at the
war's outset, had made it clear he would defy judicial orders that he
determined might endanger the military effort-and hence the
United States' entire constitutional form of government. Lincoln
independently asserted astonishingly broad powers in addition to the
blockade, such as suspending the writ of habeas corpus.64 Especially
concerned that Maryland would secede (thereby cutting off Washing-
ton from the Northern states), Lincoln directed U.S. Army officials to
throw Confederate sympathizers in military prisons.65 One of them,
John Merryman, filed a habeas writ to the appropriate Circuit Court,
where Chief Justice Taney sat.66 Taney ruled that Lincoln had vio-
58 See id. at 670.
59 See id. at 668-71 (citing federal statutes). But see id. at 697-98 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Lincoln did not possess the constitutional power to order
the blockade and seizures without prior legislative authorization).
60 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
61 See id. at 250-54.
62 Id. at 252.
63 See id. at 254 (citing Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28-35 (1827)).
Lincoln created military commissions with extensive jurisdiction. See DANIEL FARBER,
LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 8, 20, 144-45, 163-75 (2003). Such tribunals had been
used without legislative authorization or judicial review since the American Revolu-
tion. See John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rusmfeld, 2005-2006
CATO SuP. CT. REv. 83, 89.
64 See FARBER, supra note 63, at 17-21, 117, 157-63, 192-95. Lincoln detained
thousands of civilians without trial. Id. at 19-20, 144, 157. He also unilaterally
expanded the army, appropriated money to pay soldiers, and banned disloyal speech
and publications. Id. at 17-18, 117-20, 132-33, 135-38, 144, 164, 170-75, 192,
196-97.
65 See id. at 16-17, 19-20, 117, 157-63.
66 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
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lated his oath to faithfully execute the law by usurping the Article I
power of Congress to suspend habeas corpus and the judiciary's Arti-
cle III power to determine whether a private citizen had been
detained in violation of the Due Process Clause. 67
Lincoln ignored Taney's order. Instead, in an address to Con-
gress, he argued that the Constitution implicitly conferred on the
President all powers necessary to preserve the Union. 68 In 1863, Con-
gress retroactively endorsed Lincoln's suspension of habeas. 69
Furthermore, Lincoln carried out his pre-election pledge to
refuse to follow the Court's constitutional interpretation in Dred Scott
v. Sandford ° that the federal government could not interfere with
state power over slavery. 71 Indeed, he audaciously claimed that the
President as Commander in Chief could unilaterally emancipate mil-
lions of slaves in rebellious areas, even though such a sweeping policy
determination appeared to be legislative in nature. 72
67 See id. at 147-53.
68 See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 297, 309 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds.,
Francis D. Tandy Co., 1905) (1894). Initially, Lincoln made the disingenuous argu-
ment that he could act because Article I did not expressly say that "Congress," rather
than "the President," could suspend the writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 310. But see
Menyman, 17 F. Cas. at 148-52 (persuasively demonstrating that Article I conferred
this power on Congress alone).
Far more compelling is Lincoln's claim that "measures, otherwise unconstitu-
tional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
constitution, through the preservation of the nation." Letter from Abraham Lincoln
to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
1859-1865, at 585, 585 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). The President's oath to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" as a whole justified any actions neces-
sary to save the United States, even those that temporarily sacrificed individual consti-
tutional provisions. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 691, 722 (2004) (reviewing DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S
CONSTITUTION (2003)) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8); see also Barron & Led-
erman, Commander in Chief, Part II, supra note 19, at 997-1004 (stressing that Lincoln,
in articulating this rationale, recognized that he needed the later approval of Con-
gress (which he received) and that his exercise of war powers was subject to legislative
regulation).
69 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.
70 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
71 Id. at 446-52; see also Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the
Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1017, 1022 (1987) (set-
ting forth Lincoln's position that federal political officials, in the course of discharg-
ing their Article I and II duties, did not have to accept the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution in Dred Scott or any other case).
72 See FARBER, supra note 63, at 19, 21, 144-45, 152-57.
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Overall, Lincoln established that a strong President can disregard
explicit and critical constitutional provisions-and their interpreta-
tion by federal courts-if he concludes that doing so is necessary to
meet a serious military crisis and Congress approves his action (even
after it was taken) .73 Woodrow Wilson learned this lesson well, as he
successfully suppressed freedom of expression and other constitu-
tional rights during World War 1.74
The pattern continued during World War II. The Court repeat-
edly caved in to Franklin Roosevelt's assertions (often supported by
weak or nonexistent evidence) that military necessity justified his
seemingly plain violations of constitutional rights and liberties. Three
cases illustrate this abdication.
First, in Ex parte Quiin,75 a unanimous Court initially construed
an ambiguous federal statute as empowering the President to use his
own military commissions to try enemy combatants accused of violat-
ing the laws of war.76 The Court then upheld a commission's sen-
tence of capital punishment against Nazi spies (including an
American citizen) who had snuck into the United States, and rejected
their argument that the Constitution guaranteed their right to a trial
in civilian court with ordinary procedural protections.77 The Quiin
opinion does not mention that Roosevelt had garnered overwhelming
public support in this matter and that he had used back channels to
let the Justices know he intended to execute the saboteurs even if the
Court reached a contrary decision.
78
Second, in Korematsu v. United States,79 the Court sustained an
executive order (approved by Congress) excluding Americans ofJapa-
73 See CLINTON ROssITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 24
(rev. ed. 1976).
74 See Pushaw, supra note 20, at 1034-35 (citing sources).
75 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
76 See id. at 21-30, 38-39, 45-48. This statutory construction obviated the need
for the Court to decide Roosevelt's claim that he possessed independent Article II
power to create military tribunals. See id. at 28-29; see also Pushaw, supra note 20, at
1036 & n.136 (discussing the relevant statutory language).
77 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21-23, 25-28.
78 See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REv.
309, 319-32 (detailing the background of this case, including Roosevelt's inappropri-
ate pressure); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1291 (2002). The vast majority of Americans
endorsed the trial of the spies by military tribunals, were aghast at the Court's deci-
sion to interfere, and approved of its swift judgment (rendered the day after oral
argument) permitting the commission to proceed. SeeJack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sun-
stein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 261, 266-69 (2002).
79 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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nese descent from the West Coast to prevent sabotage and espionage,
despite the serious infringement of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights to liberty and equality.80 Even though it turned out that the
political branches had no credible evidence that Japanese Americans
were treacherously disloyal, the Court stressed that it could not in
hindsight say that the actions taken during the emergency after Pearl
Harbor were unjustified.81
Third, Roosevelt seized over sixty plants where labor disputes and
other problems had impeded the war effort.82 The Court waited until
the end of hostilities to consider legal challenges to these seizures,
then dismissed the cases as moot.8 3
In all these decisions, the Court recognized that it could not real-
istically prevent Roosevelt-a remarkably popular President who acted
with enthusiastic congressional approval-from taking any steps he
deemed essential to win World War II, which imperiled not only the
United States but all democracies. 84 Under these extreme circum-
stances, it is likely that Roosevelt would have successfully ignored any
Court order to desist.8 5
Even after World War II ended, however, the Court almost always
continued to defer to the political branches' military decisions. For
instance, it sustained the President's power to convene military com-
80 See id. at 215-18.
81 See id. at 223-24. Justice Jackson argued that the Court should have dismissed
the case because it lacked the confidential and relevant information to meaningfully
examine the President's claim of military necessity but that, having exercised judicial
review, the majority should have invalidated this executive order because it unconsti-
tutionally discriminated against Americans of Japanese descent. See id. at 242-48
(Jackson,J., dissenting); see also id. at 245-46 (contending that the Court's approval of
the government's conduct established a constitutional principle that could be used to
sustain similar discrimination in the future, and was therefore more dangerous than
the military order itself, which was temporary).
The Court previously had upheld a curfew imposed on Japanese Americans
before their evacuation from the West Coast. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 91, 105 (1943).
82 See ROSSITER, supra note 73, at 59-63 (describing these seizures and the Court's
timid response).
83 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United States, 326 U.S. 690, 690 (1945) (per
curiam).
84 See Pushaw, supra note 20, at 1039.
85 Indeed, FDR had indirectly informed the Court that he would defy any order
prohibiting him from executing the Nazi saboteurs. See supra note 78 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, during the 1930s Roosevelt had demonstrated his willingness
to challenge the Court. See Pushaw, supra note 20, at 1039 n.149 (citing examples).
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missions to try alien enemies in In re Yamashita8 6 and Brandt v. United
States 7-and even noncombatant American citizens in certain cases,
like Madsen v. Kinsella.88 Most pertinently, Johnson v. Eisentrage89 held
that Article III courts did not have jurisdiction, under either the fed-
eral habeas statute or the constitutional provision that " [t] he Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it," to
hear a petition from a nonresident enemy alien who had been cap-
tured in China, convicted there of war crimes by an American military
commission, and transferred to a United States military prison in Ger-
many.90 Citing a long and unbroken line of precedent, the Court
declared: "Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and
unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history,
essential to war-time security."9' The Court warned that permitting
federal judges to extend habeas corpus beyond their territorial juris-
diction would hamper the war effort and help our enemies by impos-
ing major risks and costs (particularly in transporting and caring for
detainees and their witnesses), undercutting the authority of com-
manding officers and distracting them, and causing friction between
the judiciary and the military.92 Therefore, the Court declined to
review the proceedings of the military tribunal-an institution with
longstanding authority to adjudicate violations of the law of war.93
86 327 U.S. 1, 5-6, 25-26 (1946) (refusing to question the President's decision
after World War II to use a military commission, featuring rules of procedure and
evidence that diverged from those applied in ordinary courts martial, to convict and
sentence to death a Japanese general for war crimes).
87 333 U.S. 836, 836 (1948) (per curiam) (dismissing a habeas petition filed by
Nazis who had been convicted by a U.S. military tribunal at Nuremberg); see also
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (ruling that alien enemies had no constitu-
tional right to be free from wartime detention in the United States pursuant to a
federal statute).
88 343 U.S. 341, 342-43, 362 (1952) (upholding the jurisdiction of a military tri-
bunal to try an American civilian accused of murdering her husband when he was
serving after World War II in the United States-occupied sector of Germany); see also
id. at 346-48 (emphasizing that the Court had acknowledged the President's Article II
power "[s]ince our nation's earliest days" to create military commissions, and fashion
their procedures, to meet military exigencies).
89 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
90 Id. at 765-76, 781.
91 Id. at 774; see also id. at 776-77, 777 n.8 (citing cases and other historical
sources).
92 See id. at 778-79. The Court distinguished its assertion of habeas jurisdiction
in Quirin on the ground that the Nazi spies had been arrested and tried within the
United States for crimes committed there. See id. at 779-80.
93 Id. at 786-87.
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Interestingly, even the Warren Court did not second-guess the
President's military decisions, but rather confined its liberal constitu-
tional revolution to the domestic sphere.94 Indeed, in the half-cen-
tury following Chief Justice Warren's ascension to the bench in 1954,
the Court never invalidated an exercise of war powers.
95
In sum, in every historical era, the Court typically has acceded to
the President's exercise of war powers. Such deference always has
been shown when a politically strong President, backed by Congress,
responded to a military emergency-regardless of how seriously he
infringed individual legal rights. Even in less dire circumstances, how-
ever, the Court has been inclined to yield to the political branches'
military decisions.
2. Cases Invalidating the President's Exercise of War Powers
Occasionally, however, the Court has departed from its deferen-
tial posture. Such cases invariably have involved a politically vulnera-
ble and unpopular President who unilaterally took a
disproportionately drastic action, after a military crisis had passed,
that egregiously invaded constitutional rights.
The landmark decision is Ex parte Milligan,96 issued the year after
the Civil War had ended. The Court granted a writ of habeas corpus
to an Indiana citizen who had been sentenced to death by a military
commission for conspiracy against the federal government, reasoning
that he deserved an ordinary jury trial because he had never been a
soldier and the civilian courts had always remained open.97 The
Court asserted: "The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people,
94 Some of those domestic cases involved policies that related to military affairs
but did not involve the actual authorization or prosecution of a war. See, e.g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 259-60, 262 (1967) (concluding that a federal statute
which barred Communists from employment in defense plants violated the First
Amendment); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 146, 165-67 (1963) (strik-
ing down an Act of Congress that rescinded the American citizenship of anyone who
had evaded military service during World War II or the Korean War).
95 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662-66, 686 (1981) (uphold-
ing the President's unilateral order suspending private claims in American courts
against Iran, which had been issued as part of the effort to resolve the Iran hostage
crisis); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3-4, 6-9 (1973) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a
claim that negligent training of the National Guard had led to the shooting of anti-
Vietnam War protestors at Kent State University). See generally Pushaw, supra note 20,
at 1044-45 (citing numerous other examples and noting that lower federal courts also
rejected constitutional challenges to America's undeclared wars in Southeast Asia,
Nicaragua, the Persian Gulf, and the former Yugoslavia).
96 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
97 Id. at 107-08, 118-27.
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equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protec-
tion all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."98
Because this soaring rhetoric so obviously conflicted with the Court's
recent abdication in constitutional cases (including those involving
military tribunals), it frankly admitted:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a
correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. Then, considera-
tions of safety were mingled with the exercise of power; and feelings
and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the
public safety is assured, this question, as well as all others, can be
discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any ele-
ment not required to form a legal judgment.99
The Court did not mention that AndrewJohnson had no political
capital to spend on a fight with the judiciary. A Southern Democrat
who had remained loyal to the Union and was selected Vice President
by the Republican Lincoln as a conciliatory gesture, Johnson assumed
office upon Lincoln's assassination and quickly became embroiled in
a bitter struggle over Reconstruction with the dominant Radical
Republicans in Congress, which culminated in his impeachment. l0
Alas, the Court's newfound commitment to defend the Constitu-
tion "at all times, and under all circumstances" lasted less than a year,
when it began to capitulate to constitutionally dubious Reconstruction
legislation. 10 1 The conclusion seems inescapable that the Justices real-
ized that they could defy the politically vulnerable Johnson, but not
the powerful Congress. Moreover, in World Wars I and II the Court
proved itself wholly unable to fulfill its promise in Milligan to render
purely "legal judgment[s]" protecting constitutional rights after
98 Id. at 120-21.
99 Id. at 109.
100 See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
1-25, 89-95 (1973). Although Lincoln made the initial decision to try Milligan,John-
son had become President by the time the case got to the Court, and he was in no
position to challenge its authority.
101 See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 475-76, 497-501 (1867)
(refusing to review the constitutional validity of Acts of Congress establishing military
governments in each former Confederate state); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
50, 76-77 (1868) (declining to entertain a claim that Congress had unconstitutionally
abolished a state's existing government); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
508-09, 512-15 (1869) (sustaining the power of Congress to repeal the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction over a pending case brought by a newspaper editor who had been
jailed for criticizing Mississippi's military government and who had attacked the con-
stitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts).
1996 [VOL. 84:5
2009] CREATING LEGAL RIGHTS FOR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
"calmness in deliberation" when military emergencies threatened
"public safety" and excited passionate "feelings and interests." 10 2
Again, however, after World War II the Court carefully chose a
few cases to reassert some role for the judiciary.10 3 Most notably, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,10 4 sixJustices denied Harry Tru-
man's claim of Article II power to unilaterally seize and operate Amer-
ican steel mills, threatened with closure by a labor strike, to ensure
production of arms and materials for the Korean War.10 5 The Court
emphasized that Truman had not demonstrated that the military situ-
ation was so urgent as to warrant his draconian response (taking pri-
vate property domestically without providing due process or just
compensation), especially since he had not received specific congres-
sional permission.10 6
Justice Jackson focused on this latter consideration in his famous
concurring opinion, which set forth a flexible, contextual approach to
war powers featuring three major categories. 10 7 First, he posited that
if the President acts pursuant to legislative authorization, the strongest
possible presumption of constitutionality arises, rebuttable only upon
the exceedingly difficult showing that the federal government as a
whole lacks power.10 8 Second, when Congress is silent, the President's
disputed assertion of power would be resolved politically.' 0 9 Third,
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress . . . ."110 Justice Jackson placed
the steel seizure in the third category and concluded that Truman had
102 See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315-23 (1946) (interpreting an
Act of Congress imposing martial law on Hawaii, which did not specifically mention
military tribunals, as prohibiting the President (now Truman) from employing them
to try loyal citizens (not alien soldiers) for ordinary crimes when the civil courts
remained open).
104 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
105 Id. at 582-89.
106 See id. at 585-88 (concluding that Truman was not exercising his Article II
"executive power" because Congress had not enacted a law for him to enforce, and
that he could not rely upon his power as Commander in Chief because he was not
directing the troops overseas but rather intervening in a domestic labor dispute).
107 See id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 635-37.
109 Id. at 637.
110 Id.
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not demonstrated the requisite exclusive constitutional power.' As
Chief Justice Vinson and two other dissenters pointed out, however,
several generally worded federal statutes and Article II empowered
the President to do anything he deemed necessary to wage war suc-
cessfully (including the seizure of property), and the Court had
repeatedly upheld similar executive actions during wartime.112
The dissenters' legally persuasive argument suggests that unspo-
ken pragmatic considerations influenced the majority's judgment.
The political reality was that by 1952 Americans were tired of war,
Truman had become one of the most unpopular Presidents in history,
and he did not have the political resources or incentives to stand up to
the Court. 113 The majority also must have thought that Truman's
wholesale takeover of a major American industry-a serious invasion
of Fifth Amendment rights-could not be justified because the rela-
tively minor conflict in Korea lacked the same urgency and magnitude
of World War II or the Civil War.
111 See id. at 640-55. The Court later adopted Justice Jackson's analytical frame-
work. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
112 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 663-710 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). Thus, although
Justice Jackson assigned Truman's action to Category 3, the dissenters viewed it as a
Category 1 situation, and others might plausibly have put it into Category 2 because
federal statutes neither authorized nor prohibited the President's specific conduct.
In short, Justice Jackson's analytical framework did not provide clear guidance to
decide Youngstown itself, much less future cases. Cf Mark Tushnet, The Political Con-
stitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451,
1458-62 (2007) (criticizing Jackson's opinion on the ground that all constitutional
decisions about war powers, not merely Category 2 disputes, depend on politics).
Nonetheless, most scholars have praised Jackson's "reciprocity" model of shared
constitutional powers. See, e.g., Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief 81 IND.
L.J. 1169, 1169-75 (2006). Professor Kinkopf rejects the consensus that (1) the Presi-
dent deserves deference in interpreting Acts of Congress concerning war powers, and
(2) courts should require a "clear statement" of statutory authority for the President's
actions that implicate individual constitutional rights. Id. at 1169, 1176-86. Rather,
he argues that such canons of construction "load the dice" toward a particular out-
come and that courts instead should fairly interpret particular statutes in light of their
factual settings. Id. at 1176, 1179, 1180-81, 1187-97.
113 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 63, 64-75 (2002); see alsoJ. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Consti-
tution After September 11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 42 (2002) (characterizing
Youngstown as "the backlash to the legally clumsy attempt, by a famously unpopular
President, to invoke national security as the justification for seizing steel mills during
a labor dispute in 1952, an election year in which control of the White House subse-
quently shifted from one party to the other"). Indeed, Truman himself had publicly
declared that he would abide by the Court's judgment and the wishes of Congress.
See Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief Part II, supra note 19, at 1058-59.
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In sum, the Court can cite cases like Milligan and Youngstown
when it wishes to strike down the President's exercise of military pow-
ers. Such opinions provide legal cover for kicking weak Presidents
when they're down.
3. Summary
The Court has adopted a practical approach to judicial review in
the military context, which consists of a complicated weighing of vari-
ous legal and political factors in light of the facts and circumstances of
each case. Unlike in the domestic sphere, the Court does not simply
substitute its interpretation of the Constitution for that of the political
branches, but rather accords their views far more respect. 114 The
result is that, in the vast majority of decisions, the Court either has
deemed the exercise of war powers to be a political question (as in
The Prize Cases, Vallandigham, and Eisentrager) or has asserted jurisdic-
tion but deferred to the President, despite his infringements on indi-
vidual constitutional rights (for example, Quiin and Korematsu).
Sometimes, however, the Court has seized unique opportunities
(invariably when the President is politically weak) to announce legal
limits on military authority. Such decisions, however, have never sig-
naled a lasting shift to aggressive judicial checking of the political
branches. Rather, they recede into the mists when the next emer-
gency hits. This historical background should be kept in mind when
examining the recent cases involving alleged terrorists.
II. FIGHTING AND LITIGATING THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Al Qaeda's September 11 attacks triggered a forceful response by
President Bush and Congress, which in turn precipitated a host of
legal challenges. The Court has tried to set limits on the political
114 Admittedly, even in internal matters, the Court since 1937 has shown great
deference to Congress when it exercises its Article I powers. For instance, no statute
enacted under the taxing and spending power has been invalidated, and only two
trivial laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause have been struck down. See
Grant S. Nelson & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social
Issues, 85 IowA L. REv. 1, 79-93, 161-62 (1999).
Such cases, however, involved arguments that Congress had exceeded its Article I
authority. By contrast, when a plaintiff claims that a federal statute regulating domes-
tic affairs violates individual constitutional rights, either on its face or as applied, the
Court shows little deference. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312
(1990) (holding that an Act of Congress protecting the American flag from burning
or other disfigurement violated the First Amendment).
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branches while leaving them enough discretion to wage the War on
Terrorism.
On September 18, 2001, Congress in its Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF) empowered the President to use "all necessary
and appropriate force" against those who planned, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks. 1 5 Relying upon both that statute and Arti-
cle 11, George Bush swiftly sent armed forces to Afghanistan (which
had actively supported al Qaeda) and stepped up antiterrorism
efforts.11 6 Most significantly, he asserted power to indefinitely detain
anyone he determined was an "enemy combatant" and, at his option,
to try such persons by military commissions appointed by the Secre-
tary of Defense. 117
In four habeas corpus cases brought by such enemy combatants,
the Court held that the President had exceeded his authority under
either statutes or the Constitution in a way that violated individual
legal rights.1 8 A critical examination of these decisions reveals legal
reasoning that is so strained as to invite the conclusion that practical
and political considerations generated the results. The proposed
four-factor analysis helps to make sense out of the Court's cases.
A. Hamdi: The Due Process Rights of Citizen Detainees
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld considered a habeas corpus petition brought
by an American citizen who had been captured in Afghanistan by
American troops.' 19 The government accused Hamdi of fighting with
the Taliban, designated him an "enemy combatant," and detained
him indefinitely at several military prisons (most recently, one in
South Carolina).12° Hamdi's father claimed that his son had gone to
Afghanistan to do "relief work."121
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court initially noted that
Hamdi was covered by a 1971 statute prohibiting the United States
from detaining any citizen "'except pursuant to an Act of Con-
gress."' 122 The majority found such authorization in the AUMF's "all
necessary and appropriate force" language, which implicitly included
115 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. V 2005)).
116 See Pushaw, supra note 20, at 1005, 1058.
117 See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted in 10
U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
118 See infra Part II.A-D.
119 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004) (plurality opinion).
120 See id. at 510.
121 Id. at 511.
122 Id. at 517 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000)).
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the President's long-recognized power to imprison enemy combat-
ants-even citizens-for the duration of an armed conflict. 123
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause gave
citizen-detainees the right to receive notice of the factual basis for
their classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker124-which might take the
form of an impartial, "appropriately authorized" military tribunal.125
The majority rejected the originalist argument of Justices Scalia and
Stevens that Hamdi, as an American citizen, had a constitutional right
to a criminal trial in an Article III court with full procedural and evi-
dentiary protections. 126 Justice O'Connor concluded that such elabo-
rate proceedings would undermine the government's legitimate
interests in avoiding disclosure of military secrets, preventing the
diversion of military officers from their duties, and precluding enemy
soldiers from returning to take up arms against America. 127 The
Court declared that its compromise approach balanced the judiciary's
"time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and
resolving [individual rights] claims"'128 with sensitivity to the execu-
tive's superior competence over military affairs. 129
In dissent, Justice Thomas maintained that the Court should have
limited its inquiry to determining whether Article II and the AUMF
had authorized the President to detain enemy combatants.' 30 Having
decided that question in the affirmative, the Court should have
declined to second-guess the President's judgment-committed to
123 See id. at 517-23; see also id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with this
point). Justices Souter and Ginsburg concluded that the AUMF lacked the specific
congressional authorization for imprisonment of citizens required by the 1971 stat-
ute. See id. at 541-51 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concur-
ring in the judgment).
124 See id. at 524-39 (plurality opinion). Not surprisingly, the Court relied upon
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866). See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530-31
(plurality opinion).
125 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 533-35 (stressing that
proceedings could be tailored to meet the unique needs of the military setting, such
as by relaxing the regular rules of evidence). But see id. at 553-54 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (contending that a
military tribunal would not satisfy due process standards).
126 See id. at 554-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 See id. at 531-34 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas maintained that these
interests, and others such as gathering intelligence from detainees, should have led
the Court not to craft a balancing test but to refuse to question the President's judg-
ment altogether. See id. at 594-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 535 (plurality opinion).
129 Id. at 531, 535-36.
130 Id. at 579-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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him alone by the Constitution-that Hamdi was in fact an enemy
combatant who deserved detention to protect the public.131
This dissent had ample support in presidential practice and judi-
cial precedent. 132 Conversely, Justices Scalia and Stevens made a
cogent argument, based on the original meaning of the Constitution's
text, that Hamdi deserved a full-blown trial.133 Justice O'Connor tried
to steer a middle course that fulfilled the Court's duty to exercise judi-
cial review, yet acknowledged that its case law (reflecting the realities
of modern warfare) had made it impractical to insist upon ordinary
criminal trials.1 34 The result was a legal mishmash that (1) swept
under the rug much inconvenient precedent in which the Court had
either refused to question or meekly reviewed the President's determi-
nations concerning the confinement and trial of enemy combatants,
and (2) transplanted due process standards that had been developed
in the context of hearings for government benefits to the entirely dif-
ferent situation of military detention.1 3 5 Lost in the rhetoric was a
critical legal point: Hamdi represented the first time the Court had
ever recognized that Congress authorized a presidential war power,
yet had struck it down as unconstitutional.13 6
In short, law alone cannot explain the result in Hamdi. Rather,
the decision continued the pattern of making a discretionary and
131 See id.
132 See supra Part I.B.1 (summarizing the Court's usual deferential approach).
133 See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the
Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006) (providing detailed historical
support for the position that the Constitution guarantees a regular criminal trial in
federal court to those accused of treason, including American citizens and aliens liv-
ing in the United States who are not accompanying an invading armed force).
Although I do not dispute Professor Larson's historical analysis, this approach strikes
me as unrealistic in light of technological developments that enable small groups of
terrorists to inflict destruction on a scale the Framers could not have contemplated.
The prime examples are the September 11 attacks, which succeeded in part because
of information revealed during the ordinary criminal trials of the first World Trade
Center bombers. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2295 (2008) (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
134 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-36 (plurality opinion).
135 See id. at 529-35 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). But see id.
at 579, 594-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (decrying the application of Mathews). Two
distinguished scholars have endorsed the plurality's use of a common law balancing
test to determine due process requirements for a citizen who had otherwise been
lawfully detained under the AUMF as a battlefield captive, but have lamented Justice
O'Connor's failure to provide more clarity on several crucial issues. See Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 50, at 2036, 2052, 2071-73, 2090-93.
136 See supra notes 26, 52, 104-12 and accompanying text.
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pragmatic judgment based on a variety of factual, political, and legal
considerations.
Perhaps most importantly, the urgent crisis of September 11,
2001 had long since passed, and a majority of Justices apparently con-
cluded that the federal government had overreached by seeking to
detain alleged enemy combatants indefinitely-which might mean
permanently, as the War on Terrorism might never end.1 37 Further-
more, the government's assertion that judicial review was unnecessary
because the executive branch could be trusted to respect human
rights seemed doubtful when, shortly after oral argument, pictures of
American soldiers abusing inmates at Abu Ghraib appeared that lent
credence to earlier reports of mistreatment of detainees at other facili-
ties, such as Guantanamo. I38
Another key factor was the seriousness of the claimed violation of
individual legal rights. No constitutional liberty is more fundamental
than freedom from unlawful restraint, which had long been secured
in Anglo-American law through the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus.' 39
Finally, the Court was confident that President Bush would obey
its judgment. Most obviously, he had always expressed respect for the
Court as an institution and had never suggested that he would defy its
orders. Nor was the President in any position politically to do so. He
had taken office after losing the popular vote in 2000 but winning the
Electoral College thanks to a wafer-thin margin in Florida-a result
secured by a controversial Supreme Court opinion.140 Nonetheless,
Bush always governed as if he had a mandate. Most notably, after Sep-
tember 11 he asserted broad unilateral war powers under Article II,
which seemed unnecessary because Congress had already granted him
vast general authority to fight terrorists-and would almost certainly
have given him any specific powers he requested.14 ' For the next year
137 SeeJules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PrTr. L. REv. 767,
776-90 (2002).
138 See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 627, 653 (2006);Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in
the "War on Terror, " 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1013, 1050-51 (2008).
139 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion).
140 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). For detailed critiques of
this decision, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a
Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359 (2001); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., The Presi-
dential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 603 (2001).
141 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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and a half, Bush's approval ratings ranged from sixty to ninety
percent. 42
His downfall began with the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, which
he justified on several grounds: that Saddam Hussein had supported
al Qaeda, that he possessed weapons of mass destruction, that the
Iraqis would welcome America as liberators, that we would achieve a
swift victory, and that a thriving democracy would blossom. 143 When
these assumptions proved false, Bush's popularity declined.
By the time of the Hamdi decision, his approval level had fallen
below fifty percent, 144 and pollsters predicted he would lose the
November 2004 election. 145 Nor could Bush make Hamdi much of a
campaign issue, because the decision had been supported by con-
servative Republicans like Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor.
All of the aforementioned considerations apparently overcame
one that previously had been dispositive: Congress had authorized the
President's actions. The Court did not mention the novelty of this
result, much less explain why it felt free to flex its muscles against
Congress. Perhaps the most plausible reason is that the approval rat-
ing of Congress had dropped even lower than that of George Bush,
and many members were engaged in close reelection campaigns. 146
Given these practical and political realities, I disagree with the
many legal commentators who portrayed Hamdi as a courageous deci-
sion in which the Court heroically vindicated constitutional rights and
liberties against the unprecedented military aggressiveness of the
mighty Bush administration.1 47 I doubt that the Court would have
142 See George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval, http://www.gallup.com/poll/
116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx (last visited March 18,
2009).
143 See Fisher, supra note 41, at 1200, 1212-16, 1223, 1228-54 (detailing the Bush
administration's legal, political, and factual errors and misjudgments that led to the
Iraq War, and bemoaning the failure of Congress and the media to challenge the
executive branch).
144 See USA Today, What Americans Are Saying, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
politicselections/nation/polls/otherpolls.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
145 See USA Today, Campaign 2004: USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results, http:/
/www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/polls/usatodaypolls.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 18, 2009). Bush managed to rebound to over fifty percent in October and
won a close election in November. See id.
146 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Congress Approval Rating Matches Historical Low, GALLUP,
Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/28456/Congress-Approval-Rating-
Matches-Historical-Low.aspx (setting forth poll results from 1974-2007).
147 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, 1 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 73, 73-74, 87 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth
Annual John W. Hager Lecture, the 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law,
12 TutsAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 13-17 (2004).
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been quite so brave if the United States had suffered another major
terrorist attack after September 11, Americans had demanded forceful
military retaliation, and a popular President had followed the voters'
will.
B. Rasul: Statutory Habeas Corpus for Alien Enemy Combatants
1. The Justices' Opinions
The companion case to Hamdi was Rasul v. Bush, which involved
an Act of Congress empowering federal district courts, "'within their
respective jurisdictions,"' to entertain habeas corpus petitions filed by
those who claimed they had been detained in violation of federal
law. 148 The Court interpreted this statute as extending habeas juris-
diction to anyone with custody over foreigners captured overseas and
confined in Guantanamo, which by treaty is subject to Cuba's "ulti-
mate sovereignty" but is under U.S. control and jurisdiction. 149
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens acknowledged that this
holding conflicted with Johnson v. Eisentrager, which had rejected the
claim that federal courts possessed either constitutional or statutory
habeas jurisdiction over foreigners who had been found guilty of war
crimes by a military tribunal abroad and imprisoned in Germany. 150
The Court concluded that Eisentrager did not apply, for two reasons.
First, unlike the petitioners in that case, the detainees here were not
citizens of nations at war with America, had denied committing any
hostile acts against the United States, had never been heard before
any tribunal, and were being held in territory that America con-
trolled.1 51 Second, Eisentrager's statutory ruling had been cursory and
had implicitly been overruled in the 1973 Braden case, 152 which
allowed a federal district court in Kentucky to entertain a habeas peti-
tion filed by a prisoner located outside of its territorial jurisdiction (he
was being detained by a federal court in Alabama) as long as its pro-
cess could reach his custodian. 153
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented from the majority's "novel" and "irresponsible"
148 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c)(3) (2000)).
149 Id. at 473-85.
150 See id. at 475-76.
151 See id. at 475.
152 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
153 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95). But see id. at
485-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting the assertion that Braden overruled Eisen-
trager, but finding that the latter case did not preclude jurisdiction because of the
differences between the petitioners in Eisentrager and Rasu!).
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holding that the habeas statute "extend[ed] to aliens detained by the
United States military overseas, outside [its] sovereign borders.., and
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of all its courts," which "contra-
dict[ed] a half-century-old precedent on which the military undoubt-
edly relied, Johnson v. Eisentrager."154 He scoffed at the notion that this
case had been overturned by Braden, which dealt with the entirely dif-
ferent issue of an American criminal subject to the jurisdiction of two
courts within the United States and therefore did not even mention
Eisentrager.15 5 Justice Scalia emphasized that "[i]n abandoning the
venerable statutory line drawn in Eisentrager, the Court boldly extends
the scope of the habeas statute to the four corners of the earth.' 56
This result ignored Eisentrageys warning that such judicial overreach-
ing could harm America's war effort and help its enemies by diverting
our commanders' attention, exposing our soldiers to needless risk,
imposing significant costs, and embroiling the judiciary in controver-
sies with the military.157
2. A Critique of Rasul
From a purely legal standpoint, Justice Scalia's argument is unas-
sailable. The habeas corpus statute plainly limits jurisdiction to the
court located in the territory where the prisoner is held. 158 Indeed,
this restriction is so clear that the Court in Eisentrager found it unnec-
essary to elaborate upon its six-word conclusion that the statute does
not cover aliens detained beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States (and hence its courts), 159 and instead devoted its opin-
154 Id. at 488-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 488-89, 494-98.
156 Id. at 498.
157 Id. at 499.
158 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (2006) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within
their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the
records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is
had.").
159 The Court reversed the judgment of a circuit court that had interpreted the
habeas statute as conferring jurisdiction to avoid the possibility of invalidating the law
as unconstitutionally suspending the writ. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
767, 791 (1950) (reviewing Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966-67 (D.C. Cir.
1949)). The Court rejected the alien prisoners' claim that they enjoyed the privilege
of habeas corpus: "Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor
does anything in our statutes." See id. at 768. Except for that sentence, the opinion
focuses on the constitutional issue. Id. at 768-78; see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488-94
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Eisentrager correctly interpreted the habeas
statute).
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ion to demonstrating that the Constitution confers no such right
either. 160 Moreover, it is hard to give any credence to the assertion of
Justice Stevens that the Court in a domestic criminal case (Braden)
somehow forgot to mention that it was overruling a well-established
precedent (Eisentrager) in the unrelated context of foreign enemies
captured and held abroad. 161 Perhaps most tellingly, even the two
leading academic critics of the Bush administration's enemy combat-
ant polices, Neal Katyal and David Cole, conceded that Eisentragerpre-
cluded statutory habeas relief in RasuL.162
In short, Rasul did not result from an objective application of
legal principles, but rather from the same pragmatic calculus that
took place in Hamdi.163 Indeed, I submit that the majority's opinion
is so patently wrong that they must have issued it not as a serious legal
analysis but rather to send a message to the politically vulnerable Pres-
ident and Congress: the writ of habeas corpus would be available to
challenge Guantanamo policies. 164 The Court believed that the gov-
ernment's actions were unnecessarily draconian to meet the actual
threat posed. The majority apparently thought that their obviously
bizarre statutory construction would deter Congress from revising its
legislation to clarify that habeas jurisdiction did not reach aliens cap-
160 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768-78.
161 See supra note 152-53 and accompanying text.
162 See Neal Katyal, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After
September 11 ? SunsettingJudicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE D AME L. Rxv. 1237 (2004) (making
this admission, but contending that Eisentrager should not be treated as binding today
because of intervening changes in both law-such as America's adoption of the
Geneva Conventions in 1955 and the Warren Court's transformation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause-and war, particularly the stateless and permanent nature of the fight
against terrorism); Cole, supra note 138, at 651, 653 (asserting that the detainees won
in Rasul not because of their "strained" legal arguments but rather "because Guanta-
namo had become an international embarrassment to the United States").
Similarly, Professors Fallon and Meltzer have applauded the outcome in Rasul,
but have acknowledged that the opinion ofJustice Stevens did not coherently explain
(1) why habeas cases like Braden concerning citizens suddenly applied to aliens, and
(2) whether the federal habeas statute reached all foreign enemies detained abroad
(which would contradict Eisentrager) or merely those in Guantanamo (which would be
defensible as a common law extension of precedent because of the unique status of
that American-controlled naval base). See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 50, at
2056-59, 2064.
163 See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
164 See Martinez, supra note 138, at 1049-53 (arguing that Rasu/'s ostensibly nar-
row procedural ruling based on statutory construction was actually intended to send a
signal to the President and the Congress about the Court's views on the detainees'
substantive legal rights, especially its willingness to apply to them the constitutional
guarantee of habeas corpus).
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tured and held outside of the United States, because such a denial of
habeas might well be struck down as unconstitutional.1 65
Despite this thinly veiled threat, Congress overturned Rasu's stat-
utory interpretation. 166 Nonetheless, doing so did not defy the
Court's judgment, either technically (because Congress ultimately can
determine the meaning of its own laws) or substantively (because Con-
gress established an alternative process that allowed Guantanamo
detainees to challenge their confinement as unlawful in an Article III
court-the same purpose served by habeas).167
3. The Political Branches' Response to the Court's Decisions
Shortly after Hamdi and Rasul came down, the Bush administra-
tion guaranteed elaborate procedural protections to everyone held at
Guantanamo. At the initial stage, no detainee would be deemed an
"enemy combatant" without first receiving "multiple levels of review by
military officers and officials of the Department of Defense."1 68 Next,
a detainee could challenge his designation as an enemy combatant
before a Combat Status Review Tribunals (CSRT).1 69 There he would
be appointed a Personal Representative, who would review and sum-
marize classified documents and help the accused present exculpatory
evidence by testifying, calling witnesses who were reasonably available,
questioning witnesses summoned by the tribunal, and introducing rel-
evant documents. 170 The CSRT had power to decide whether the gov-
ernment had unlawfully imprisoned the detainee and, if so, to order
his release. 17 1
Conversely, if the CSRT affirmed the Defense Department's
determination, the detainee could be tried by a military commission.
Such commissions would follow the usual procedural rules of military
165 See id. at 1051-53 (suggesting that the Court hoped its threat ofjudicial review
to invalidate the political branches' curbing of habeas procedures would induce them
not to make such cutbacks, but that the President and Congress "apparently did not
receive the intended signal").
166 See Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X,
§ 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741-42. Section 1005(e)(1) amended the Habeas
Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). This statutory provision will be discussed
infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
167 See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
168 Memorandum from Gordon R. England, Sec'y of the Navy, U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Implementation of Combat Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy
Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, at Enclosure(1) 1 (July
29, 2004) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
169 See id.
170 See id. at Enclosure(l) 2.
171 See id. at Enclosure(1) 9.
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courts, except that they could: (1) exclude the defendant from any
part of the proceeding to protect "national security interests" (such as
safeguarding intelligence sources or activities); (2) admit any evi-
dence they determined had probative value to a reasonable person
(including hearsay); and (3) block the accused's access to classified
information if doing so would not deny him a fair trial. 172
In contrast to the executive's quick response, Congress spent a lot
of time drafting the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA). 173 This statute
incorporated the executive regulations concerning military adminis-
trative determination of "enemy combatant" status followed by CSRT
review, while adding a requirement that the Secretary of Defense pro-
mulgate procedures for periodic consideration of "any new evidence"
relating to that status and for an annual review to determine the need
to continue to hold alien detainees. 174  Furthermore, section
1005(e) (2) of the DTA gave the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit "exclusive jurisdiction" to decide whether the Defense Depart-
ment's standards and procedures were properly applied by the CSRT
and were consistent with the federal Constitution and laws.1 75 Finally,
section 1005(e) (3) granted the D.C. Circuit the same jurisdiction over
military commission decisions176 -a provision that presupposed con-
gressional approval of such commissions.
Because the DTA authorized a federal court to hear claims by
Guantanamo detainees that they were being held illegally (the basic
function of habeas), Congress did not consider ordinary habeas juris-
diction to be necessary for them. Accordingly, section 1005(e) (1) of
the DTA provided that "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdic-
tion to hear or consider. . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained ... at Guantanamo Bay."'1 7 7
This provision would "take effect on the date of [its] enactment [Dec.
30, 2005] ."178
In short, Congress and the President addressed the Court's con-
cerns. The political branches took seriously Hamdi's invitation to
172 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613-15, 621-25 (2006) (summarizing
these procedures).
173 See Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739-44.
174 See id. § 1005(a), 119 Stat. at 2740-41. Moreover, the DTA directed the Presi-
dent to appoint (with the Senate's approval) a Designated Civilian Official as the final
review authority within the Defense Department of the decisions of the CSRT and any
other administrative review board. Id. § 1005(a) (2), 119 Stat. at 2741.
175 See id. § 1005(e) (2), 119 Stat. at 2742-43.
176 See id. § 1005(e) (3), 119 Stat. at 2743.
177 See id. § 1005(e) (1), 119 Stat. at 2742.
178 See id. § 1005(h) (1), 119 Stat. at 2743.
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determine what kind of impartial decisionmaker (including military
tribunals) and procedures for citizen-detainees would satisfy due pro-
cess standards while meeting military needs. 179 Indeed, the DTA went
well beyond Hamdi's minimum requirements by (1) extending proce-
dural protections to noncitizens, and (2) providing not merely for mil-
itary tribunals (CSRTs and military commissions), but also for review
in an Article III court. Similarly, although Congress corrected Rasuls
misinterpretation of the general habeas corpus statute, it acted within
the spirit of that decision by providing Guantanamo detainees with
habeas-like procedural protections. The political branches' efforts,
however, did not prevent further litigation.
C. Hamdan: More Creative Statutory Interpretation to Deny the
President Authority to Establish Military Commissions
In July 2004, the Bush administration brought terrorism charges
against Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni who had been captured in Afghani-
stan, taken to Guantanamo, and designated an "enemy combatant" by
the military. °80 A CSRT affirmed that determination, and proceed-
ings before a military commission commenced.181 However, a federal
district court swiftly granted Hamdan's request for a habeas writ based
on its conclusion that his military commission had violated the Uni-
form Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions.182
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed in an opinion
joined by then-Judge Roberts, which ruled that the Geneva Conven-
tions were notjudicially enforceable, that Hamdan's military commis-
sion did not run afoul of the UCMJ, and that such tribunals were
constitutional under Quirin.183
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 2005.184
Congress then enacted DTA section 1005(e) (1), which provided that
as of December 30, 2005, "no court, justice, or judge" had jurisdiction
to consider habeas actions by alien detainees at Guantanamo.1 85
Because Congress had removed the Court's jurisdiction, the govern-
179 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion).
180 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566-70 (2006). The government
accused Hamdan of assisting Osama bin Laden as a bodyguard/driver, transporting
weapons to al Qaeda, and receiving weapons training. See id. at 570.
181 Id. at 570-71.
182 Id. at 571 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-72 (D.D.C.
2004)).
183 Id. at 571-72 (describing the circuit court decision).
184 Id. at 572.
185 See DTA, div. A, tit. X, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e) (1), (h), 119 Stat. 2739,
2741-43.
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ment moved to dismiss. 186 Remarkably, the Court concluded that
Congress had not intended to eliminate its jurisdiction (despite sec-
tion 1005(e)(1)'s language seeming to do precisely that) or to author-
ize military commissions (despite section 1005(e)(3)'s apparent
acceptance of their validity). These holdings will be examined in
turn.
1. Snatching Jurisdiction from the Jaws of a Congressional Repeal
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito voted to dismiss the case, for
two reasons.' 87 First, the DTA unequivocally stripped any "court"
(including the Supreme Court) of jurisdiction to hear habeas peti-
tions by aliens detained at Guantanamo. 188 Second, venerable prece-
dent established that Article III gives Congress absolute power to
make "Exceptions" to the Court's appellate jurisdiction and that a stat-
ute eliminating jurisdiction applies to pending cases, absent an
express reservation of jurisdiction.18 9 Justice Scalia then argued that
(1) the DTA's elimination of jurisdiction did not unconstitutionally
suspend the privilege of habeas corpus because this writ does not
extend to an enemy alien confined outside of the United States' sover-
eign territory,1 90 and (2) in any event, Congress had provided a consti-
tutionally adequate substitute for habeas by authorizing both the D.C.
Circuit and Supreme Court to review the military commissions'
decisions. 191
In the face of this apparently impregnable legal analysis, Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer (joined in part by Justice Ken-
nedy) ingeniously recharacterized the controlling precedent. They
asserted that the Court's repeated holdings that statutes stripping
jurisdiction applied to pending cases had not stated a black-letter rule
(as had always been thought), but rather established a mere "pre-
sumption against jurisdiction." 192 The majority found that this pre-
sumption had been rebutted after applying "[o] rdinary principles of
statutory construction" to the DTA to conclude that it had not
186 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572.
187 See id. at 656-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188 See id. at 655-57.
189 See id. at 656-61, 672 (listing numerous cases dating back to the mid-1800s); see
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (setting forth the Exceptions and Regulations Clause).
190 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 669-70 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citingJohnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950)).
191 See id. at 670-71 (identifying several cases recognizing that Congress could pro-
vide such alternative procedures).
192 See id. at 576-77 (majority opinion).
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repealed the Court's jurisdiction. 193 The opposite interpretation, Jus-
tice Stevens warned, would "raise[] grave questions about Congress'
authority to impinge upon this Court's appellate jurisdiction, particu-
larly in habeas cases. . . . [Hamdan] suggests that, if the Govern-
ment's reading is correct, Congress has unconstitutionally suspended
the writ of habeas corpus.' 1 94 The Court's clever statutory construc-
tion enabled it to seize jurisdiction and reach the merits.
2. Did Congress Authorize Military Commissions?
The majority held that neither the DTA nor the AUMF had spe-
cifically empowered the President to create military commissions, and
they refused to imply such authorization. 195 Indeed, the commissions
violated the directive of Congress-which the Court discovered for
the first time lurking in UCMJ section 36(b)-that executive branch
procedural rules for such commissions must "'be uniform insofar as
practicable"' with those of courts martial. 196 Justice Stevens chided
President Bush for not making an "impracticability" determination
sufficient to justify departing from court-martial practice when he
authorized the commission to exclude the defendant as necessary to
protect national security interests, admit hearsay, and deny the
accused access to classified information that might be exculpatory. 197
193 Id. at 575-80. Justice Stevens invoked the arcane interpretive rule that "a nega-
tive inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provi-
sion that is included in other provisions of the same statute." Id. at 578. As applied
here, section 1005(h)(2) of the DTA explicitly made sections 1005(e)(2) and
(e) (3)-which confer "exclusive jurisdiction" on the D.C. Circuit to review "final
decision[s]" of CSRTs and military commissions-applicable to pending cases, but
section 1005(h)(1) did not contain such a similar express termination of pending
cases as to section 1005(e)(1). See id. at 578-84.
Put simply, Justice Stevens determined the meaning of the DTA based upon an
obscure canon of construction instead of the fundamental rule of interpretation: rea-
sonably discerning the intent of the legislature. Congress clearly meant to repeal the
Court's jurisdiction by providing that "no court" had jurisdiction to consider Guanta-
namo detainees' habeas petitions, and the Court previously had always held that such
statutes applied to pending cases. See id. at 655-57, 660-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The most dramatic indication that the majority had contravened the intent of Con-
gress was its swift amendment of the DTA to overturn Hamdan. See infra Part II.D.
194 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion).
195 See id. at 593-95; id. at 650-51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
196 See id. at 620-25 (majority opinion) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000)); id. at
639-641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197 See id. at 613-15 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military
Commission Order No. 1, at 9 (Mar. 21, 2002)); id. at 623-24; id. at 644-53 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
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The majority admitted that Yamashita was "a glaring historical
exception to the general [uniformity] rule," but asserted that Con-
gress had amended its laws to extend UCMJ protections to persons
like Hamdan. 198 For good measure, the Court held for the first time
that the Geneva Conventions were judicially enforceable and prohib-
ited the military commissions as constituted.1 99
In dissent, Justice Thomas picked apart the majority's interpreta-
tion of the AUMF and UCMJ.20 0 Initially, he argued that the AUMF's
conferral of authority on the President to use "'all necessary and
appropriate force"' against the terrorists surely was meant to include
the long-acknowledged power to try enemy combatants by military
tribunals.20' In fact, Justice Thomas demonstrated that all similarly
broad legislative delegations in the past had been interpreted this way,
and that the Court had repeatedly recognized the validity of military
commissions. 20 2 Moreover, he stressed that Congress had anticipated
AUMF-type grants when it enacted Article 21 of the UCMJ, which pro-
vides that the conferral of jurisdiction on courts-martial "'do [es] not
deprive military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by law of war may be
tried by military commissions .. '. "203
Justice Thomas also showed that UCMJ Article 36(b) had reaf-
firmed the President's longstanding power-recognized in cases such
as Vallandigham, Quirin, Yamashita, Brandt, and Madsen-to create mil-
itary tribunals and to prescribe procedures that deviated from those of
198 Id. at 617-20 (majority opinion); id. at 651-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Because Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens and his three colleagues that
Congress had not authorized Hamdan's military commission and that its structure
and procedures were invalid, he found it unnecessary to reach the questions of
whether the law of war included conspiracy and whether Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions required that the defendant be continuously present at trial. See
id. at 653-55. In dicta, the plurality answered "no" to the first question and "yes" to
the second. See id. at 595-613, 633-35 (plurality opinion). The dissenters reached
the opposite conclusions. See id. at 697-704, 715-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). I will
not consider such international law issues here.
199 See id. at 626-31 (majority opinion); id. at 637, 641-43, 651-53 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
200 See id. at 679-724 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 678-83 (quoting AUMF, § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)).
202 See id. at 680-81 (citing supporting statutes and cases); see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 252, 256-57 (2002)
(maintaining that the AUMF arguably contained the most sweeping delegation of war
powers to a President in history and unquestionably authorized George Bush to cre-
ate military commissions).
203 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 681-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2000)).
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ordinary court-martial procedures when he deemed uniformity to be
impracticable.2 0 4 Hence, contrary to the claims of Justice Stevens,
Yamashita was hardly a "glaring exception" to a "rule" that the Presi-
dent had to maintain procedural uniformity.20 5 Justice Thomas
added that the Court had always previously found the Geneva Conven-
tions to be enforceable politically rather than judicially.20 6
In conclusion, Justice Thomas maintained that several federal
statutes-enacted in conformance with the Constitution's language,
underlying separation-of-powers design, history, and precedent-com-
manded the Court to defer to President Bush's decision to convene
military commissions to try enemy combatants. 20 7 The majority's defi-
ance of established legal principles, he warned, might have disastrous
consequences by hindering the ability of the President and Congress
to fight terrorists. 20 8
3. A Legal and Pragmatic Appraisal of Hamdan
Evaluated in strictly legal terms, Hamdan makes little sense. The
arguments of Justice Thomas should easily have prevailed because
they were supported by entrenched constitutional practice and prece-
dent in all three branches. 20 9
First, Presidents have always asserted power to try enemy soldiers
for war crimes by creating military tribunals and determining their
structure and procedures.210 The startling implication of Hamdan is
that, for two centuries, our Commanders in Chief have been acting
lawlessly-even giants like Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt.21
204 See id. at 706-12. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the majority had
properly interpreted Article 36(b) as requiring the President in ajudicial proceeding
to justify his departures from court-martial procedures, President Bush had deter-
mined that it was impracticable to use such rules because of the singular problems
raised in trials against accused terrorists. See id. at 712-14.
205 See id. at 708-11.
206 See id. at 716-18 (citing governing precedent).
207 See id. at 678-724.
208 See id. at 678-79, 691, 705-06.
209 Two distinguished national security scholars had anticipated all of these argu-
ments and set forth detailed legal support for them. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 50, at 2127-31.
210 See supra Part I.B1.
211 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Diarmuid O'Scannlain, Hamdan's Limits and the
Militay Commissions Act, 23 CONsT. COMMENT. 403, 404 (2006) (deeming this decision
.remarkable" because the Court had never previously curbed the President's ability to
try unlawful combatants by military tribunals, a practice that dated back to the Revolu-
tionary War); id. at 404-21 (emphasizing that the MCA repudiated the Hamdan
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Second, Congress had often recognized the President's authority
to convene military commissions of his own design to try enemy com-
batants. Most importantly, Article 21 of the UCMJ codified this power
generally. 212 Furthermore, if the AUMF's grant of power to the Presi-
dent to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against the terrorists
implicitly included his long-acknowledged authority to detain enemy
combatants (as Hamdi had held), then it also should have included
the equally venerable power to try them by military tribunals.213
Finally, the DTA confirms the understanding of Congress that it had
already granted President Bush such authority, because section
1005(e) (3) assumes the validity of his military commissions and pro-
vides for appeals from their judgments. 214
Third, the Court had invariably sustained the President's power
to convene military tribunals to try enemy combatants for war
crimes-and had never second-guessed his judgment that national
security necessitated such commissions. 215 This deference was shown
even in cases involving American citizens, such as Vallandigham and
Quiin.216 The Hamdan majority's conclusion that alien enemies have
greater legal rights than citizens is self-evidently incorrect.
majority's holding, which rested on dubious legal reasoning, that Congress had not
authorized military commissions).
212 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 21, 64 Stat. 108, 115 (1950) (current
version at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006)). An eminent academic reached this conclusion
based on the UCMJ's text and legislative history shortly after its enactment in 1950,
and his interpretation is especially reliable because he could not possibly have been
influenced by subsequent events such as September 11. See ROSSITER, supra note 73,
at 102-03, 109-11. Several modern law professors have similarly demonstrated that
Congress intended to codify Quirin's holding that Article of War 15 empowered the
President to create military commissions by incorporating Article 15's text word-for-
word in Article 21 of the UCMJ. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 2130;
Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 274-75.
213 See supra Part II.A. But see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 50, at 2088-89 (con-
tending that, because Hamdan could be imprisoned indefinitely, no security exigency
prevented the majority from insisting on clearer congressional authorization than
that found in the generally worded AUMF before the Court would override other
specific statutory provisions governing military commissions).
214 See Yoo, supra note 63, at 97. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles
and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (arguing that Hamdan
reasonably ruled that the President, except perhaps in true emergencies, must act
pursuant to unambiguous legislative authorization if he departs from standard adjudi-
catory procedures and that such a "clear statement" was absent here, but conceding
that the Court also could have plausibly concluded that Congress had approved the
military commissions and that they did not violate any law).
215 See supra Part I.B.1.
216 See supra notes 60-63, 75-78 and accompanying text (describing these cases).
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Equally implausible is the Court's use of diametrically opposed
interpretive approaches depending on whether the statute concerned
its own jurisdiction or the President's powers. On the one hand, the
majority leniently construed sections 1005(e)(1) and (h) of the DTA,
which appeared to strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear Hamdan's
appeal, as doing no such thing. On the other hand, the Court inter-
preted the UCMJ, AUMF, and DTA, which almost surely authorized
the President to convene military commissions, to mean the opposite.
The only common thread linking these two rulings is that they both
maximized the Court's power vis-a-vis the political branches. 2 17
As with Rasul, the most damning indictment of the Court's legal
analysis in Hamdan came not from its critics 2 18 but rather from its
supporters. For instance, David Cole, who led the legal academy's
condemnation of the Bush administration's antiterrorism policies and
who applauded the result in Hamdan, candidly conceded that the
Court had ignored its settled law:
To say that Hamdan faced an uphill battle is a gross understate-
ment. The Supreme Court has said in the past that foreign nation-
als who are outside U.S. borders, like Hamdan, lack any
constitutional protections. Hamdan was a member of the enemy
forces when he was captured, and courts are especially reluctant to
interfere with the military's treatment of "enemy aliens" in wartime.
He filed his suit before trial, and courts generally prefer to wait until
a trial is completed before assessing its legality. And as recently as
World War II, the Supreme Court upheld the use of military tribu-
nals, and ruled that the Geneva Conventions are not enforceable by
individuals in U.S courts but may be enforced only through diplo-
matic means.
... And as if Hamdan did not face enough hurdles, after the
Supreme Court agreed to hear his case, Congress passed a law that
appeared to be designed to strip the Supreme Court of its jurisdic-
tion to hear the case....
The fact that the Court decided the case at all in the face of
Congress's efforts to strip the Court of jurisdiction is remarkable in
itself. That the Court then broke away from its history of judicial
deference to security claims in wartime to rule against the Presi-
dent, not even pausing at the argument that the decisions of the
commander in chief are "binding on the courts," suggests how
217 See Devins, supra note 28, at 1581.
218 For example, President Bush's main post-September 11 constitutional law
advisor on the War on Terrorism argued that the Court had ignored both the direc-
tive of Congress to refrain from exercising jurisdiction and its own precedent validat-
ing military tribunals. See Yoo, supra note 63, at 99-103.
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troubled the Court's majority was by the President's assertion of uni-
lateral executive power.2 19
Professor Cole did not explain how merely feeling "troubled" per-
mits five Justices to disregard their long-established legal duties to
honor the decision of Congress to remove the Court's jurisdiction and
to defer to the President's discretionary determination that a foreign
enemy combatant should be tried by a military commission. 220 Simi-
larly, Martin Flaherty, a distinguished scholar of constitutional law and
human rights, admitted that Congress probably had enacted the DTA
to repeal the Court's jurisdiction in Hamdan, but praised the Court
for asserting power anyway -and courageously thwarting President
Bush.221  Perhaps most significantly, Hamdan's own attorney,
Georgetown Law Professor Neal Katyal, had acknowledged in an ear-
lier article that Quifin was directly on point in supporting the Presi-
dent's power to establish military commissions. 222
In short, Hamdan's legal analysis was so unpersuasive, even to
those who favored the result, that it cried out for an alternative expla-
nation.223 Again, three practical factors appear to have influenced the
Court most heavily.
219 David Cole, Why the Court Said No, N.Y. REV. BooS, Aug. 10, 2006, at 41, 41-42.
220 Although Professor Cole wisely did not even attempt to rationalize the Court's
usurpation of jurisdiction in the teeth of a contrary Act of Congress, he did suggest
that the majority had properly concluded that Bush asserted "unilateral" power. Id. at
42-43. I do not find that statutory interpretation plausible-and neither did Con-
gress, which immediately overturned it. See infra Part I.D. But even if I agreed with
the majority that President Bush lacked statutory authorization, precedent dictated
judicial respect for his independent military judgments under Article II-as Cole
essentially concedes by noting that "the Court then broke away from its history of
judicial deference to security claims in wartime." Cole, supra note 219, at 42.
221 See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule of
Law, and Comparative Executive "Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005-2006 CATO
SuP. CT. REV. 51, 57-58, 82. Many other liberal academics have questioned the
Court's statutory interpretation. See Baron & Lederman, Commander in Chief Part I,
supra note 19, at 703-04 (citing Burt Neuborne and Cass Sunstein, among others).
222 See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 78, at 1283-90 (making this concession, but
arguing that Quirin should not be treated as a controlling precedent because it had
been decided in a factual and legal context quite different from that presented by the
War on Terrorism).
223 See Tushnet, supra note 112, at 1451-72 (contending that Hamdan, which held
merely that Congress had not authorized Bush's military commissions, illustrates the
recurrent theme that constitutional "law" concerning emergency powers depends
upon interactions between the political branches, not substantive rules applied by
courts). A few Hamdan supporters, however, have tried to defend the Court's deci-
sion on its own legal terms. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115
YALE L.J. 2350 (2006) (praising the Court for properly rejecting the Bush administra-
tion's exorbitant claims of unilateral war powers and instead restoring Youngstown's
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First, the September 11 emergency had long since passed, the ter-
rorists had not attacked America again, and domestic life had
returned to normal-unlike past military struggles that required the
continuous mobilization of all Americans to ensure our very survival
as a nation, such as the Civil War and World War 11.224 Under these
relatively calm circumstances, Justice Stevens and his four colleagues
apparently felt that President Bush did not need to convene military
commissions because existing tribunals (such as courts martial) would
suffice. The dissenters, on the other hand, would have deferred to
the President because they deemed the War on Terrorism to be an
urgent and ongoing struggle. 22
5
Second, the majority viewed the government's actions as threat-
ening fundamental due process values and the sacred writ that
secured them, habeas corpus. 2 2 6 For example, Justice Stevens explic-
itly said that he interpreted the DTA as not stripping the Court of
jurisdiction in order to avoid the "grave" question of whether such a
repeal would amount to an unconstitutional suspension of habeas. 227
Likewise, the Court's tortured constructions of the AUMF and UCMJ
suggested a desire to sidestep the issue of whether the military com-
missions' manner of appointment, structure, and procedures were so
heavily weighted against the detainees as to violate the Due Process
Clause. 228 The dissenters eschewed such strained statutory interpreta-
balanced constitutional approach, in which Congress and the courts play meaningful
roles in military decisionmaking).
224 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 280-82 (emphasizing that the legal
intelligentsia supported military commissions in World War II but not in the War on
Terrorism, which they view as a minor skirmish that has caused few changes or sacri-
fices in daily life); see also Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law" and the Military Commis-
sion, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 761, 762-65 (2006-2007) (stressing that the passage of
time after the initial shock of September I Ith invited growing public and judicial
skepticism about the executive's bold assertions of inherent power).
225 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 705 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("We are not engaged in a traditional battle with a nation-state, but with a worldwide,
hydra-headed enemy, who lurks in the shadows conspiring to reproduce the atrocities
of September 11, 2001 .... [The majority's decision] sorely hamper[s] the Presi-
dent's ability to confront and defeat a new and deadly enemy.").
226 See Devins, supra note 28, at 1484-85 (observing that the Court sees its special
role as protecting individual rights and is therefore particularly sensitive to restric-
tions on habeas corpus).
227 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575-76 (majority opinion).
228 Significantly, Hamdan's lead attorney offered this explanation for the out-
come. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 74-75, 87-91 (2006); see also id. at 97-105 (main-
taining that the Court's statutory construction was influenced by constitutional con-
siderations implicated by the President's assertion of unlimited Article II power to
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tions because they saw no constitutional problems: practice and prece-
dent had established that alien enemy combatants outside of the
United States had no right to habeas and could be tried by military
commissions. 2 29
Third, the Court knew President Bush would not defy its judg-
ment. He had not done so after Hamdi and Rasul, and he was now in
an even weaker political position. The main reason was the Bush
administration's inept execution of the Iraq War, which dragged on at
a huge cost and thereby exacerbated the economic problems wrought
by the September 11 attacks and other factors. Bush's approval rating
had sunk to an all-time low of thirty-one percent,23 0 and his party
would soon lose control of Congress. 23 1 Furthermore, the Court tech-
nically held only that no statute had repealed its jurisdiction or
authorized military tribunals, which meant that Bush could seek con-
gressional action on both issues without running afoul of the Court's
order.23 2 As Justice Breyer summarized the majority opinion:
The Court's conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Con-
gress has not issued the Executive a "blank check." Indeed, Con-
gress has denied the President the legislative authority to create
military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents
the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he
believes necessary.23
3
Nonetheless, these official pronouncements were like an iron fist
inside a velvet glove. As with Rasul, the majority distorted the relevant
legislation and precedent so blatantly as to invite the conclusion that
they simply wished to send a message to President Bush and Congress:
Do not again attempt to take away federal court jurisdiction over the
create military tribunals, formulate their procedural rules, and change those rules at
any time).
229 See supra Part I.B.1.
230 See Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee, Poll Gives Bush His Worst Marks Yet on
Major Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006, at Al.
231 For a detailed account of the 2006 congressional elections, which shifted con-
trol from the Republicans to the Democrats, see Jason Manning & Alyson Hurt, Wash.
Post, 2006 Election Results, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/elections/keyraces/
map (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); see also Devins, supra note 28, at 1589-94 (pointing out
that the Court in Hamdan, as in Youngstown, checked an unpopular President who
had claimed sweeping powers to wage war despite heavy public criticism).
232 See Devins, supra note 28, at 1586-94 (arguing that the Hamdan Court cleverly
asserted judicial supremacy yet depicted itself as modestly attempting to preserve the
prerogatives of Congress, thereby avoiding a clash with the legislative branch while at
the same time keeping open its option to reach the constitutional question in a later
case).
233 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Guantanamo detainees or to try them by military commissions. If you
have the audacity to do so-to amend the statutes to make clear that
you meant what you said originally-we will find a way to strike them
down as unconstitutional.
But the political branches did not get (or did not heed) the mes-
sage. Instead, they accepted at face value, perhaps gullibly, the notion
that Hamdan was simply about lack of statutory authorization.234 The
struggle between the Court and the political branches, however, was
not about law but about power-who would ultimately control antiter-
rorism policy?235 It is quite possible that Congress and the President
understood this point, and decided once and for all to let the Court
know they were in charge. Whether out of naivet6 or stubbornness,
the political branches set up another clash with the Court.
D. Boumediene: A New Constitutional Right to
Habeas for Foreign Enemies
Congress quickly overturned Hamdan's two key statutory interpre-
tations by passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA) on October
17, 2006.236 First, section 7(a) amended the DTA to make clear that
"[n]o court,justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear" either (1)
"an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by ... an alien ...
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant," or (2) "any other action ... relat-
ing to any aspect of [his] detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or con-
234 For example, President Bush said he took the Court's opinion "very seriously"
and would cooperate with Congress to enact legislation that addressed the majority's
concerns. See Charlie Savage, Justices Deal Bush Setback on Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 30, 2006, at Al; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and
the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNATIONAL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933,
934-41, 956-94 (2007) (maintaining that the Court genuinely sought to protect the
constitutional role of Congress in limiting the President's exercise of war powers).
235 SeeJana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759
(2007) (contending that Hamdan primarily concerned not the appropriate relation-
ship between the President and Congress but rather the Court's injection of itself as a
key player in national security disputes that implicated individual rights, and there-
fore predicting (correctly) that the Court would aggressively resist the MCA); see also
Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional Power to Remove
Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1248-52 (2007) (debating Professor
Yoo's proposition that the Court's plainly mistaken statutory interpretations in Hamdi
and Hamdan reflected the political miscalculation that Congress would back down)
236 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 10, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
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ditions of confinement."23 7 Second, section 7(b) provided that these
amendments "shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this
Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or
after th [at] date."23 8
These words spelled out the intent of Congress with such
emphatic clarity that they left no room for any interpretive sleight of
hand. Thus, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court unanimously held that
section 7 of the MCA had denied all federal courts jurisdiction to con-
sider the habeas petitions of alien enemy combatants at Guantanamo,
including cases pending at the time of the statute's enactment. 239
Nonetheless, the same five Justices in the Hamdan majority joined
an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy holding that: (1) the Consti-
tution extended the privilege of habeas corpus to these petitioners;
(2) Congress had effectively suspended the writ, and its DTA proce-
dures were an inadequate substitute for habeas; and (3) the detainees
did not have to exhaust the DTA remedy of review in the D.C. Circuit
before proceeding with their habeas actions in the district courts. 240
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia wrote separate dissents, joined
by Justices Thomas and Alito, disputing each of these points. 241
Boumediene can best be understood by examining the majority and dis-
senting opinions on the three main issues: exhaustion, the reach of
the Suspension Clause, and the adequacy of the DTA procedures.
1. Requiring Exhaustion to Avoid the Constitutional Question
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court should have made
petitioners exhaust their remedies under the DTA, thereby honoring
the congressional choice to commit to the D.C. Circuit initial review
of whether the CSRT procedures were consistent with the Constitu-
tion.242 If the D.C. Circuit determined that those procedures pro-
tected whatever due process rights alien detainees might possess
under Hamdi (an issue the majority refused to address), then no addi-
tional process would be needed, whether labeled "habeas" or other-
wise. 243 Therefore, the ChiefJustice contended, declining jurisdiction
would implement the fundamental principle that the Court should
237 See id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635-36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e)(1)-(2)
(2006)), declared unconstitutional by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
238 Id. § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 2636 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note (2006)).
239 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242-44 (2008).
240 See id. at 2244-77.
241 See id. at 2279-93 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting); id. at 2293-307 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
242 Id. at 2279-81 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
243 Id. at 2281.
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avoid deciding constitutional questions (here, about the Suspension
Clause) until absolutely necessary. 244
Justice Kennedy, however, concluded that the Court had to
depart from this rule of self-restraint because of the "grave" constitu-
tional issues and the need to avoid further delay, since some of the
petitioners had been held for as long as six years. 245 Hence, the Court
took jurisdiction, decided that the Suspension Clause protected the
alien detainees, and remanded to the District Court with instructions
to adapt normal habeas proceedings in light of "[p] ractical consider-
ations and exigent circumstances." 246
Chief Justice Roberts had two responses. First, the rule against
deciding constitutional questions prematurely applied with special
force when they were "grave." 247 Second, the majority had launched a
system that would take longer than the DTA proceedings, because
before getting to the D.C. Circuit-where petitioners could go imme-
diately under the DTA, despite their failure to do so for over two
years-they would have to endure litigation in federal trial courts,
which had been given the onerous task of designing new habeas pro-
cedures.248 These arguments, however, did not dissuade the majority
from reaching the merits.
2. The Applicability of the Suspension Clause to Alien Enemies
Located Outside of the United States
All of the Justices agreed on three points. First, judicial defer-
ence to the constitutional judgments of the political branches was at
its zenith in national security cases.249 Second, the Court had never
interprete d the Suspension Clause as protecting alien enemy combat-
ants captured and detained outside of the United States' sovereign
244 Id. at 2283.
245 See id. at 2262-63, 2274-75, 2777 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2278-79
(Souter,J., concurring) (asserting that these delays cast doubt upon the arguments of
ChiefJustice Roberts that (1) the military justice system and D.C. Circuit would han-
dle these claims in a reasonable time period, and (2) the Court was usurping power
from the political branches, rather than merely trying to make habeas review mean-
ingful despite their foot-dragging). The majority cautioned that, absent such an
undue delay, federal courts should refrain from entertaining a detainee's habeas peti-
tion at least until the CSRT had reviewed his status. Id. at 2275-76 (majority
opinion).
246 Id. at 2275-77 (majority opinion) (stressing the practical need to accommo-
date to the greatest extent possible the government's legitimate interest in protecting
classified information, including sources and intelligence-gathering methods).
247 Id. at 2282 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
248 Id.
249 See id. at 2276-77 (majority opinion); id. at 2296-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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territory, and Eisentrager had rejected such a claim. 250 Third, the
Clause incorporated the practice of England's common law courts,
which similarly had never in a reported case extended the habeas
corpus writ extraterritorially to foreigners. 25'
Given this legal background, Justice Scalia and his fellow dissent-
ers reached the logical conclusion that the Court should respect the
government's determination that noncitizen enemy combatants
apprehended overseas and confined in Cuba did not enjoy the consti-
tutional privilege of habeas corpus. 252 The Court managed to hold
the opposite by rewriting history and its own precedents. To under-
stand this point, it is necessary to compare the opinions of Justices
Kennedy and Scalia on the original meaning of the Suspension Clause
and the cases interpreting it.
a. The Framing-Era Understanding of the Habeas Guarantee
Both the majority and dissent recognized that the Constitution's
prohibition against suspending "[t] he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus" was intended to preserve the writ as it existed at the time of
the Founding. 253 Justice Scalia demonstrated that all the historical
evidence established that the English common law writ, as codified in
the Habeas Corpus Act, extended only to territories subject to the
Crown's sovereignty (the "King's dominions")-including certain
areas like Wales and Berwick that were not part of "the realm" (that
is, England proper) .254 Conversely, the habeas writ could not issue to
other nations where the Crown was not sovereign, such as Scotland,
which was part of Great Britain but treated as a foreign dominion
under the King of Scotland.25 5 Justice Scalia repeatedly cited Chief
Justice Mansfield's definitive analysis in Rex v. Cowle2 56 (involving Ber-
wick), which is helpful to quote verbatim:
[W] rits of... habeas corpus... may issue to every dominion of the
Crown of England.
250 See id. at 2262 (majority opinion); id. at 2278 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at
2293-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251 See id. at 2248-51 (majority opinion); id. at 2297-98, 2303-06 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
252 See id. at 2293-307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253 See id. at 2247-48 (majority opinion); id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254 See id. at 2303-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2249-51 (majority opin-
ion) (rejecting petitioners' argument that Guantanamo Bay was analogous to areas
that were not part of England's "realm" but were formally considered to be part of its
sovereign territory).
255 See id. at 2304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256 (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B.).
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There is no doubt as to the power of this Court [the King's
Bench]; where the place is under the subjection of the Crown of
England; the only question is, as to the propriety.
To foreign dominions, which belong to a prince who succeeds
to the throne of England, this Court has no power to send any writ
of any kind. We cannot send a habeas corpus to Scotland .... 257
In other words, English courts had undoubted "power" to issue
habeas writs "to every dominion" subject to "the Crown of England"
(although "the propriety" of doing so might raise a discretionary
"question," especially in areas like Berwick), whereas judges had "no
power" to send a writ "[t]o foreign dominions" like Scotland. Justice
Scalia accused the majority of "mischaracterizing" Lord Mansfield's
language 258 to suggest that, when English courts did not have "power"
to issue habeas writs in foreign territories such as Scotland, it was
unclear whether they lacked jurisdiction to issue such writs or refrained
from doing so for prudential reasons (for example, to avoid conflict
with Scotland, which had its own court system and law) .259
Justice Kennedy's recharacterization of Cowle enabled him to
maintain that such prudential barriers had no relevance to Guanta-
namo, where Cuban courts have no jurisdiction, American law
applies, and federal court judgments presumably will be obeyed. 260
This reinterpretation of Cowle also provided the main support for the
majority's determination that English precedents and legal commen-
taries were "inconclusive" as to whether a common law court would
have granted a habeas petition by a foreigner detained outside of a
nation's sovereign territory, but within its military and civil control. 26'
The Court then surmised that the touchstone of English habeasjuris-
257 Id. at 599-600; see also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting this passage in part).
258 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259 See id. at 2249-50 (majority opinion) (citing Cowe, 97 Eng. Rep. at 600)).
260 See id. at 2251-53.
261 See id. at 2248-51. Justice Kennedy also noted that the historical record was
incomplete, especially because most reports of habeas proceedings had not been
printed. See id. at 2251 (citing a manuscript later published as Paul D. Halliday & G.
Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Impli-
cations, 94 VA. L. Rv. 575 (2008)). But see infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text
(contending that the original meaning of the Suspension Clause likely reflected the
understanding of habeas corpus set forth in publicly available case reports and com-
mentaries by authoritative eighteenth-century English legal figures like Mansfield and
Blackstone, not in obscure and unpublished records).
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diction may have been de facto (i.e., practical) control over a territory
rather than de jure (i.e., legal and technical) sovereignty. 262
As Justice Scalia argued, however, even if the English law incorpo-
rated into the Suspension Clause were inconclusive as to whether the
habeas writ extended to aliens in another country, that indefiniteness
would mean that the majority had no basis to strike down the inter-
pretation of that Clause by Congress and the President as not covering
foreign enemy combatants in Guantanamo. 263 The Court avoided its
duty to defer to the political branches' reasonable constitutional judg-
ments about military affairs by construing the Suspension Clause in
light of "separation of powers" principles, which assertedly gave the
judiciary a unique role in protecting detainees from "manipulation"
of habeas by the Legislature and Executive. 264 Justice Scalia retorted
that such principles
262 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251-53. The majority did not cite a single case
mentioning such a de facto control test for determining habeas jurisdiction for aliens
held outside of England's sovereign territory. Furthermore, "this novel defacto-dejure
approach does not explain why the writ never issued to Scotland, which was assuredly
within the de facto control of the English Crown." Id. at 2299 n.3 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
263 Id. at 2296-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Suspension Clause must be interpreted
in light of the centrality of the habeas writ to the Framers as a safeguard of individual
liberty, as evidenced by their careful specification of the limited grounds for its sus-
pension: only in times of rebellion or invasion, and only when public safety so
requires. Id. at 2244-47 (majority opinion). Thus, except during rare periods of
formal suspension of the writ, the judiciary had a duty to protect detainees from
abuses by the executive and legislative branches, which had occurred cyclically in
English history. See id. at 2244-45 (citing a manuscript by Professors Halliday and
White, supra note 261, describing how the King's courts initially fashioned the com-
mon law habeas writ to protect his interest in securing compliance with his laws by
examining a government jailer's authority to hold a prisoner); see also id. at 2245-47
(tracing the gradual development of habeas as a mechanism to check the Crown's
power by protecting citizens' liberty, but noting its frequent denial by courts or sus-
pension by Parliament in times of political unrest-problems which continued even
after passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
The majority concluded that "[t]he separation-of-powers doctrine, and the his-
tory that influenced its design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the
Suspension Clause." See id. at 2247; see also id. at 2253 (asserting that accepting the
government's sovereignty-based test for constitutional habeas jurisdiction would be
"contrary to fundamental separation-of-powers principles"); id. at 2259 (maintaining
that, because the habeas writ is "an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the sep-
aration of powers," the standards governing its extraterritorial scope "must not be
subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain"); id. at 2277
("Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial
power are as legitimate or as necessary as ... hear[ing] challenges to the authority of
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are to be derived not from some judicially imagined matrix, but
from the sum total of the individual separation-of-powers provisions
that the Constitution sets forth. Only by considering them one-by-
one does the full shape of the Constitution's separation-of-powers
principles emerge. It is nonsensical to interpret those provisions
themselves in light of some general "separation-of-powers princi-
ples" dreamed up by the Court. Rather, they must be interpreted to
mean what they were understood to mean when the people ratified
them. And if the understood scope of the writ of habeas corpus was
"designed to restrain" (as the Court says) the actions of the Execu-
tive, the understood limits upon that scope were (as the Court seems
not to grasp) just as much "designed to restrain" the incursions of
the Third Branch. "Manipulation" of the territorial reach of the writ
by the Judiciary poses just as much a threat to the proper separation
of powers as "manipulation" by the Executive.... [M]anipulation is
what is afoot here. The understood limits upon the writ deny our
jurisdiction over the habeas petitions brought by these enemy
aliens, and entrust the President with the crucial wartime determi-
nations about their status and continued confinement. 265
In short, the majority invoked "separation of powers" notions to
conclude that, because courts must thwart political abuses of the
habeas writ, English common law cases should be read as recognizing
judicial discretion to issue the writ to aliens held outside of England's
sovereign territory but within its practical control. This innovative
methodology, which enabled the Court to revise English history,
yielded the same result when applied to American precedents.
b. Case Law on the Suspension Clause
The majority and dissent agreed that the most relevant decision
was Johnson v. Eisentrager,266 which involved Germans who had been
apprehended in China, convicted there of war crimes by an American
military commission, and transferred to a military prison in the Ameri-
can Zone of occupied post-war Germany.2 6 7 Writing for the Court,
Justice Jackson rejected the German detainees' application for a
habeas writ on the following basis:
the Executive to imprison a person . . . [through] habeas corpus, a right of first
importance .... ).
265 Id. at 2297-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266 Eisentrager is discussed in Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58 (majority opinion),
and id. at 2298-302 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying
text (analyzing Eisentrager).
267 SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950).
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We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other
country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an enemy
alien who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has
been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the
Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our
statutes.
268
As Justice Scalia noted, the Eisentrager opinion repeatedly reinforced
this quoted language to make clear that territorial sovereignty deter-
mined habeas jurisdiction over a foreigner 269: "Eisentrager thus held-
held beyond any doubt-that the Constitution does not ensure habeas
for aliens held by the United States in areas over which our Govern-
ment is not sovereign."2 70
Justice Kennedy conceded that the Court in Eisentrager had
denied the writ because the prisoners "'at no relevant time were
within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and
[that] the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial, and their
punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of
the United States."' 2 71 He insisted, however, that this language did
not mean that Eisentrager had "adopted a formalistic, sovereignty-
based test for determining the reach of the Suspension Clause."27 2 He
offered two reasons for this conclusion, each of which Justice Scalia
disputed.
First, Justice Kennedy speculated that, because the United States
lacked both dejure and de facto sovereignty over the German prison,
the Court did not necessarily use "sovereignty" in the technical legal
sense.273 Justice Scalia identified the obvious flaw in this reasoning:
the United States surely exercised practical de facto control over a
268 Id. at 768.
269 See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2298 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("' [I]n extending
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point
out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judi-
ciary power to act.'" (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771)); id. at 2298 (noting that
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779, had distinguished Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita,
which both permitted enemy aliens to seek habeas relief (albeit unsuccessfully), on
the ground that those detainees had been in custody within "our sovereignty").
270 Id. at 2298-99.
271 Id. at 2257 (majority opinion) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778).
272 Id. at 2257.
273 Id. at 2252-53, 2257. Justice Kennedy further maintained that, even if the
Court in Eisentrager had deemed America's lack of formal sovereignty over the prison
to be the decisive factor, "its holding is not inconsistent with a functional approach to
questions of extraterritoriality. The formal legal status of a given territory
affects ... the political branches' control over that territory. Dejure sovereignty is a
factor that bears upon which constitutional guarantees apply there." Id. at 2258.
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prison in the American Zone of occupation, so Eisentrager must have
turned on formal sovereignty.274
Second, the majority noted that the Eisentrager opinion devoted
considerable attention to the characteristics of the German prisoners
and to the practical difficulties of ordering the United States to pro-
duce them for habeas proceedings (for instance, shipping and guard-
ing them).275 In response, Justice Scalia showed that Justice Jackson
had set forth such factors not in application of some "functional" test,
but rather to illustrate that the case represented a particularly easy
application of the black-letter rule that aliens (whether friendly or
hostile) could not invoke habeas jurisdiction unless they were present
within America's sovereign territory.27 6 He concluded that the major-
ity had engaged in "a sheer rewriting" of the controlling case:
Eisentrager mentioned practical concerns-but not for the purpose
of determining under what circumstances American courts could issue
writs of habeas corpus for aliens abroad. It cited them to support its
holding that the Constitution does not empower courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus to aliens abroad in any circumstances....
274 See id. at 2299 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 2257-58 (majority opinion) (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779, 781).
276 See id. at 2299-300 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771,
777-78). Justice Kennedy also claimed that reading Eisentrager as formulating a nar-
row test of de jure sovereignty in determining the extraterritorial reach of the Consti-
tution would be inconsistent with the approach focusing on "practical considerations"
taken in earlier decisions. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253-58 (majority opinion).
For example, The Insular Cases established that the Constitution applied in full to
territories Congress had incorporated into the United States that were surely destined
for statehood, but only in part to unincorporated territories depending upon their
unique circumstances (such as the sophistication of their legal systems). See Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139-43 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 286-87
(1901). InJustice Kennedy's view, these decisions recognized that "practical consider-
ations" might lead the Court to apply constitutional provisions to non-citizens in terri-
tories over which the United States did not have dejure sovereignty. See Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2253-55. The dissenters replied that The Insular Cases undercut the
majority's holding because they involved American territories that were unquestiona-
bly part of the United States' sovereign territory. Id. at 2300-01 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
The Court also invoked Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which had ruled that
American civilians, who were married to servicemen and living on American military
bases in England and Japan, had been denied their constitutional right to a jury trial
when they had been convicted by military courts. Id. at 4-5, 38-41. Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that the Court in Reid had identified petitioners' American citizenship
as a key factor, but claimed that the Court also had weighed practical concerns like
the place of their confinement and trial. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255-56. Justice
Scalia responded that Reid focused exclusively on the rights of American citizens
abroad, and had nothing to do with aliens. See id. at 2301-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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... Eisentrager nowhere mentions a "functional" test, and the
notion that it is based upon such a principle is patently false.
2 7 7
Unmoved, Justice Kennedy again maintained that reading deci-
sions like Eisentrager as giving the political branches power to deter-
mine when and where the Constitution governs would let them
displace the Court in constitutional interpretation, which would be
especially troubling as to habeas because that writ was designed to
monitor those branches. 278 Accordingly, the majority gleaned from
its cases three factors, which it applied to hold that the United States'
plenary de facto control over Guantanamo Bay-not its formal dis-
claimer of sovereignty in the 1903 treaty with Cuba-should deter-
mine the foreign prisoners' habeas rights under the Suspension
Clause.2
79
The first consideration was "the citizenship and status of the
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status
determination was made. '280 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the
petitioners' non-American citizenship cut against them, but deemed it
more important that they had contested their "enemy combatant" sta-
tus (unlike the Eisentrager prisoners) and that the CSRT did not pro-
vide a "rigorous adversarial process" to determine their status
reliably.28 1 To Justice Scalia, this analysis produced the "crazy result"
that alien enemy combatants who had been sentenced to death by
military commissions after the end of a war had no judicial remedy
(Eisentrager), whereas those who merely were being held during an
ongoing conflict had an immediate right to a habeas proceeding-
and perhaps to release before their trial by a military commission. 28 2
He contended that the Guantanamo detainees were akin not to those
in Eisentrager, but rather to the prisoners of war held by the United
277 See id. at 2299-300 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 2259 (majority opinion). But see id. at 2302-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority failed to grasp that the Constitution sometimes leaves con-
stitutional decisions to the political branches and that the Court can legitimately
expound the law only in cases over which it has constitutional and statutory jurisdic-
tion-which is lacking in habeas actions involving alien enemies).
279 Id. at 2252-53, 2259-62 (majority opinion).
280 Id. at 2259.
281 See id. at 2259-60; see also id. at 2260 (emphasizing that the CSRT procedures
failed to provide detainees with an attorney, accorded the government's evidence a
presumption of validity, and did not allow the accused to obtain all evidence that
might rebut the government's charges).
282 See id. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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States during World War II-none of whom received habeas protec-
tion, even the 400,000 detained on American soil.28 3
Second, the Court evaluated "the nature of the sites where appre-
hension and then detention took place. ' 284 Justice Kennedy admitted
that the petitioners, like the Eisentrager inmates, were technically
outside the United States. 285 Nonetheless, he contrasted America's
exclusive and longstanding control over Guantanamo Bay with its
shared and short-term jurisdiction over occupied Germany, where it
had to account to the other Allied forces.286 As Justice Scalia argued,
however, the Eisentrager Court never mentioned such factors, but it
did hold that alien enemies captured and detained beyond U.S. bor-
ders had no privilege of habeas corpus.287
Third, the majority focused on "the practical obstacles inherent
in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ,"2 8 8 which in Eisen-
trager had included significant costs and diverting the attention of mil-
itary personnel responsible for a large area and population consisting
of a defeated enemy that might engage in guerrilla warfare.289 Justice
Kennedy contrasted Germany with Guantanamo-a small, isolated,
fortified, American-controlled base where extending habeas corpus
jurisdiction would not "apparentl1y]" compromise the military mis-
sion.29 0 Justice Scalia countered that the Court lacked any institu-
tional competence to second-guess the judgment of Congress and the
President that these habeas actions would hamper the war effort
because of the same diversion of military resources and costs noted in
Eisentrager2 91
Justice Kennedy concluded that the unusual circumstances of
Guantanamo and the length of the War on Terrorism (and hence of
the detainees' confinement) "lack[ed] any precise historical paral-
lel."29 2 Accordingly, it was irrelevant that
283 See id.
284 Id. at 2259 (majority opinion).
285 Id. at 2260.
286 See id. at 2260-61.
287 See id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 2259 (majority opinion).
289 See id. at 2261 (citingJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)).
290 See id. at 2261-62; see also id. at 2277 ("Our opinion does not undermine the
Executive's powers as Commander in Chief.").
291 See id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy insisted that judicial
deference to the political branches in military affairs did not mean abdication, espe-
cially given that the War on Terrorism might be of unlimited duration. See id. at 2277
(majority opinion).
292 Id. at 2262.
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the Court has never held that noncitizens detained by our Govern-
ment in territory over which another country maintains dejure sov-
ereignty have any rights under our Constitution.... [T] he lack of a
precedent on point is no barrier to our holding.
We hold that [the Suspension Clause] has full effect at Guanta-
namo Bay.
29 3
3. The Insufficiency of the DTA's Procedures
The majority ruled that section 7 of the MCA had unconstitution-
ally suspended the habeas writ because the DTA's provisions for
reviewing detainees' status were not an adequate replacement for
ordinary habeas procedures, for two reasons. 294  First, section
1005(e) (2) (C) did not authorize the D.C. Circuit to inquire into the
legality of detention generally, but rather limited that court to assess-
ing whether the Defense Department's standards and procedures had
been followed by the CSRT and whether they complied with the Fed-
eral Constitution and laws.295 Second, section 1005(e) (2) (A) gave the
D.C. Circuit "exclusive jurisdiction" and no discretion to transfer any
case to the district court to take advantage of its superior factfinding
competence-an option available in ordinary habeas proceedings. 296
293 Id. Justice Scalia took a decidedly less optimistic view:
[T]he Court warps our Constitution in a way that goes beyond the narrow
issue of the reach of the Suspension Clause, invoking judicially brainstormed
separation-of-powers principles to establish a manipulable "functional" test
for the extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus .... It blatantly misdescribes
important precedents, most conspicuously... Eisentrager. It breaks a chain
of precedent as old as the common law that prohibits judicial inquiry into
detentions of aliens abroad .... And, most tragically, it sets our military
commanders the impossible task of proving to a civilian court, under
whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that evidence supports
the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner.
The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today.
Id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncer-
tain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 23, 27-32 (con-
tending that Justice Kennedy misread Eisentrager and unwisely traded its predictable
rule for vague "functional" standards).
294 See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2262-75 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy
stressed that the two leading cases addressing habeas substitutes upheld them because
Congress had streamlined habeas processes yet had retained the courts' broad reme-
dial power to secure the historic purpose of the writ-including discretion to engage
in ordinary habeas review as a last resort. See id. at 2264-65 (citing Swain v. Pressley,
430 U.S. 372 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)). The DTA did
not confer such judicial powers. See id. at 2265-66.
295 See id. at 2265-66.
296 See id. at 2266.
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The Court concluded that the DTA's procedures failed to give
petitioners a meaningful opportunity to show they were being con-
fined unlawfully, the core purpose of habeas. 297 Most significantly,
Justice Kennedy asserted that a detainee could not effectively contest
the CSRT's findings of fact, which might be erroneous because they
were made without an ordinary adversarial hearing.298 And, even
assuming the DTA could be construed as permitting the D.C. Circuit
to review or correct the CSRT's determinations, the statute still had
one fatal constitutional defect: the D.C. Circuit could not supplement
the record on review with relevant exculpatory evidence discovered
after the CSRT proceedings had ended.2 99
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the Court had
inexplicably ignored Hamdi, which recognized that the Due Process
Clause allows habeas procedures for citizen-detainees to be restricted
to protect national security and hence requires only "basic process"-
notice of the charges and an opportunity to rebut them before a neu-
tral decisionmaker (such as an impartial military tribunal). 300 He
297 See id. at 2266, 2269, 2271-74. The majority expressed concern that the DTA
did not explicitly empower the D.C. Circuit to consider a detainee's challenge to the
President's authority under the AUMF to imprison him or to order the release of an
individual adjudged to have been detained illegally. See id. at 2271-72, 2274. None-
theless, Justice Kennedy concluded that the statute might be read as implicitly provid-
ing for such constitutionally required judicial authority. See id. at 2271-72; see also id.
at 2291-92 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (agreeing with such an interpretation, and not-
ing that the Court had long construed the general habeas corpus statute as impliedly
conferring power to release any wrongfully held prisoner).
298 See id. at 2268-70, 2272-74 (majority opinion). For instance, the CSRT proce-
dures did not afford a detainee the assistance of counsel, limited his ability to obtain
classified information and present evidence, and allowed hearsay-all of which inhib-
ited him from rebutting the factual basis for the government's conclusion that he was
an enemy combatant. Id. at 2269.
299 See id. at 2272-74; see also id. at 2267-68, 2270 (pointing out that habeas courts
in the nineteenth century had routinely added and evaluated such exculpatory evi-
dence, and maintaining that such power was now constitutionally required for any
habeas substitute). The Court acknowledged that habeas review could be more cir-
cumscribed if the underlying detention proceedings were more thorough. See id. at
2270. For example, in two cases arising out of World War II, the Court limited its
review to determining whether the executive had legal authority to try petitioners by
military commissions, which had followed adversarial processes in which the accused
enjoyed appointed counsel. See id. at 2270-71 (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
300 See id. at 2283-86 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 525, 533-34, 538 (2004)). Similarly puzzling was the majority's criticism of
the government's procedures as "limited," because habeas had long been recognized
as a flexible remedy that could be restricted depending on a detainee's status and
rights. See id. at 2286-87. Most pertinently, cases like In re Yamashita taught that alien
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argued that Congress had complied with Hamdi by giving detainees
notice, multiple levels of military review to determine whether they
should be designated enemy combatants, and a hearing before the
neutral CSRT to challenge the government's allegations by calling wit-
nesses, taking testimony, and gathering documents. 30 1
Indeed, the Chief Justice noted that Congress had gone beyond
Hamdi's requirements, in two ways. First, the DTA extended due pro-
cess rights to noncitizen detainees. 30 2 Second, Congress provided them
with additional review in an Article III court, which could examine
both whether the CSRT had complied with the Defense Department's
standards and whether those rules violated the Constitution or other
federal laws.30 3 Chief Justice Roberts lamented that Congress had
implemented Hamd's suggestions, "only to find itself the victim of a
constitutional bait and switch. °30 4
He further argued that the DTA met even the majority's own cri-
teria for an adequate alternative to habeas, because it gave petitioners
a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention as unlawful
and granted the CSRT and the D.C. Circuit power to order their
release.30 5 Indeed, the DTA afforded far more elaborate procedural
protections than those that had been given enemy combatants or pris-
oners of war in the past, which had always passed constitutional mus-
ter.306 The Chief Justice then responded to the Court's four
objections to the sufficiency of the DTA system.
First, he conceded that detainees did not have legal counsel at
the CSRT proceedings. 30 7 He pointed out, however, that the petition-
enemy combatants captured and held overseas in sovereign American territory did
not enjoy the same habeas privileges as American citizens imprisoned domestically for
ordinary crimes. See id. at 2286-87. In fact, the Court had held that enemy combat-
ants had extremely narrow habeas protections, whether they were foreigners or citi-
zens. See id. at 2286 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (limiting review of a
military commission verdict to determining whether the tribunal had jurisdiction)).
301 See id. at 2283-84.
302 See id. at 2284; see also id. at 2287 (stressing that accused enemy combatants
who were aliens surely did not enjoy greater procedural rights than those who were
American citizens).
303 See id. at 2284, 2289.
304 Id. at 2285.
305 Id. at 2287. He also expressed bewilderment that the majority would assert
that the DTA was a constitutionally inadequate substitute for habeas without identify-
ing what rights DTA or habeas review were supposed to protect. See id. at 2286. As
the Court had not even bothered to describe those rights, it obviously could not
explain how Congress had failed to protect them. See id.
306 See id. at 2289.
307 See id. at 2287-89.
2033
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ers did have the assistance of a Personal Representative before the
CSRT and an attorney for the D.C. Circuit appeal. 30 8
Second, the majority criticized the detainees' lack of unfettered
access to classified information, which might help their defense. 30 9
The Chief Justice replied that Congress had allowed the petitioners'
Personal Representative (at the CSRT stage) and attorney (on appeal)
to examine such confidential documents and summarize their sub-
stance to their clients-the first time enemy combatants had ever
been made privy to any classified information. 310
Third, Justice Kennedy complained that the detainees could not
confront all witnesses and that the CSRT could admit hearsay.3 11
Chief Justice Roberts countered that the detainees could confront (or
call) any witnesses as long as they were "reasonably available"-a tradi-
tional requirement of military regulations-and that Hamdi had
approved such restrictions (and the use of hearsay) in recognition of
the government's interest in avoiding undue disruption of its military
operations.3 12
Fourth, the Court asserted that another problem singlehandedly
rendered the DTA an inadequate substitute for habeas: the detainees
could not introduce exculpatory evidence discovered after the CSRT
proceedings. 31 3 The ChiefJustice answered that these petitioners had
the right to present evidence of their innocence before the CSRT and
to have any negative ruling reviewed by the D.C. Circuit, and that the
situation of later-unearthed evidence had not actually occurred and
thus could not be the basis for striking down the DTA as facially
308 See id. at 2288-89.
309 See id. at 2269 (majority opinion).
310 See id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, he chided the Court for
again failing to provide any concrete options:
What alternative does the Court propose? Allow free access to classified
information and ignore the risk the prisoner may eventually convey what he
learns to parties hostile to this country, with deadly consequences for those
who helped apprehend the detainee? If the Court can design a better sys-
tem for communicating to detainees the substance of any classified informa-
tion relevant to their cases, without fatally compromising national security
interests and sources, the majority should come forward with it.
Id.; see also id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that military intelligence
revealed during the first World Trade Center bombing trial, which al Qaeda had used
to facilitate the September 11 attacks, showed the foolishness of requiring the armed
forces to divulge classified information).
311 See id. at 2269 (majority opinion).
312 See id. at 2287-88 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
313 See id. at 2271 (majority opinion).
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unconstitutional. 3 14  Moreover, if that hypothetical scenario ever
arose, the DTA did give the Defense Department, the CSRT, and the
D.C. Circuit ample power to consider such exculpatory evidence.3 15
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts deplored the majority's failure to
explain how the district courts should design a habeas remedy that
balanced the detainees' rights with national security interests-for
example, how access to classified information could be tailored to
avoid compromising vital military intelligence, how military officers
stationed overseas could be called as witnesses without interfering
with their duties, and how foreign witnesses in remote locations could
be subpoenaed. 316 The Court's refusal to address these issues, and
the fact that Congress and the President had devoted considerable
effort to devising a system that did, led the ChiefJustice to predict that
the new "habeas" remedy would look a lot like the DTA procedures. 317
He ended with the following observations:
So who has won? Not the detainees. The Court's analysis leaves
them with only the prospect of further litigation to determine the
content of their new habeas right, followed by further litigation to
resolve their particular cases, followed by further litigation before
the D.C. Circuit-where they could have started had they invoked
the DTA procedures. Not Congress, whose attempt to "deter-
mine-through democratic means-how best" to balance the secur-
ity of the American people with the detainees' liberty interests, has
been unceremoniously brushed aside. Not the Great Writ, whose
majesty is hardly enhanced by its extension to a jurisdictionally
quirky outpost, with no tangible benefit to anyone. Not the rule of
law, unless by that is meant the rule of lawyers, who will now argua-
bly have a greater role than military and intelligence officials in
314 See id. at 2289-91 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
315 First, the DTA permitted the D.C. Circuit to remand to the CSRT in light of
newly found exculpatory evidence and then review the tribunal's decision. Id. at
2289-90 (citing sources). Second, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to
examine any new evidence relating to each detainee's status and, if material informa-
tion is discovered, to order a CSRT to convene for reconsideration-again, followed
by D.C. Circuit review. Id. at 2290 (citing statutory and regulatory provisions). Third,
the DTA required the Defense Department to conduct an annual evaluation of each
prisoner's status, with its findings reviewed by an appointed civilian. Id. at 2290.
316 See id. at 2292. Justice Scalia noted that even the military, in applying its legal
standards that balanced the detainees' liberty interests against national security con-
cerns, had released at least thirty Guantanamo prisoners who later committed terror-
ist atrocities. See id. at 2294-95 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Consequently, the Court's new
requirement that military officials defend their decisions before a civilian court with
procedural and evidentiary rules more stringent than those devised by the political
branches would result in the release of more such terrorists. See id. at 2294-96.
317 See id. at 2292 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
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shaping policy for alien enemy combatants. And certainly not the
American people, who today lose a bit more control over the con-
duct of this Nation's foreign policy to unelected, politically unac-
countable judges. 18
4. A Critique of Boumediene
Law professors and commentators typically have praised the
Boumediene Court's "courage" in upholding "the rule of law,"3 19 but
have not rectified its failure to explain how existing legal materials
supported its decision. This silence reinforces the sense that law had
little to do with the result, whereas pragmatic and political calcula-
tions loomed large.
a. The Law Governing Jurisdiction and the Privilege of
Habeas Corpus
Justice Kennedy's opinion does not set forth a coherent interpre-
tation of the historical meaning of the Constitution's text, structure,
or implementing practice and precedent. The majority's disregard of
settled law characterized its analysis of both jurisdictional and substan-
tive issues.
Initially, neither the dissenters nor scholars have fully grasped the
magnitude of the Court's subversion of established jurisdictional doc-
trines, most notably the heretofore plenary constitutional power of
Congress over the jurisdiction of Article III courts.3 20 Boumediene
marked the first time the Court has struck down a statute stripping it
(or any other federal court) of jurisdiction, and thus appeared to
318 Id. at 2293 (citation omitted) (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636
(2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
319 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
320 The lengthy dissents contain only one oblique reference to this problem. See
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Congress entrusted that
threshold question [i.e., whether the DTA protected detainees' rights] . . . to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as the Constitution surely allows
Congress to do."); see also Cole, supra note 15, at 48-49 (remarking on the novelty of
the Court's invalidation of a statute restricting federal jurisdiction). As this article
went to press, I became aware of a soon-to-be-published essay that addresses these
issues more thoroughly. See Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdic-
tion-Stripping: The Imperial Presidency Meets the Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming 2009) (approving the Court's unprecedented assertion of judicial
power as a proportionate response to President Bush's equally extraordinary claims of
war powers (with the acquiescence of Congress), and contending that Boumediene is
not limited to habeas cases but rather can be applied whenever Congress attempts to
eliminate federal jurisdiction over constitutional cases and thereby prevent federal
courts from checking the political branches).
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overrule sub silentio cases tracing back to Ex parte McCardle.32 1 McCar-
dle was a newspaper editor who, after criticizing the Reconstruction
Congress for imposing martial law in the South, had been charged
with seditious libel and held in Army custody while awaiting trial by a
military commission. 322 Pursuant to an 1867 statute, he petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus and appealed its denial to the Supreme Court,
which reviewed briefs and heard oral arguments. 323 While McCardle's
case was pending, Congress repealed the Court's jurisdiction. 3 24 The
Justices unanimously dismissed the appeal and declared:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legisla-
ture. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution;
and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of
this court is given by express words [in Article III].
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case
before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all .... Jurisdiction is the power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause ....
. . . [Judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining
ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Con-
stitution and the laws confer.3
2 5
321 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
322 See id. at 508.
323 See id. at 507-08.
324 See id. at 508, 513-14.
325 Id. at 514-15; see also id. at 515 (mentioning that the legislative repeal of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction in 1867 did not affect the petitioner's ability to invoke
the Court's habeas jurisdiction under a longstanding statute that had remained
intact); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (reaffirming the availability of
such alternate avenues of habeas review).
My point is that the Court failed even to cite McCardle and its progeny, much less
explain why they should not lead to the opposite result. I am not suggesting that
those decisions correctly interpreted the Constitution.
On the contrary, I have never accepted the Court's assertion that its appellate
jurisdiction over a federal question "Case" may be eliminated by Congress and not
given to any lower federal court, thereby leaving the ultimate decision to state judi-
ciaries. See, e.g., RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power over Federal Court Jurisdiction:
A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article I1, 1997 BYU L. REv. 847, 847-53,
856-97. Rather, I have adopted Akhil Amar's position that Article III provides that
federal judicial power "shall" (i.e., must) extend, in either original or appellate form,
to "all" cases arising under federal law. For a detailed development of this argument,
see id. at 849-97; see also RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdiction, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1515, 1516-17, 1541-49 (2007); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr.,
Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE
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If the Court had to honor a congressional repeal of its habeas
jurisdiction in a case concerning an American civilian who had been
detained within the United States (and hence seemingly fell squarely
within the protection of the Suspension Clause), it is impossible to
fathom how its 'judicial duty" would be less demanding in an appeal
involving alien enemy combatants confined outside of the United
States. 326
Moreover, even assuming the Boumediene majority properly
ignored McCardle, the political question doctrine dictated dismissal.
DAME L. REV. 447, 464-65, 470-82, 489-502, 523-31 (1994); cf Steven G. Calabresi &
Gary Lawson, The Unitay Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A
Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1002 (2007) (rejecting Scalia's
claim that Congress can remove the Court's appellate jurisdiction over federal law
cases as inconsistent with the objective original meaning of the Constitution's text
and structure).
Under my suggested approach, neither the DTA nor the MCA presented a consti-
tutional problem because Congress authorized review of the detainees' federal law
questions in an Article III court (the D.C. Circuit, followed by an appeal to the
Supreme Court). See DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(a)(2)-(3), 119
Stat. 2739, 2742-43 (2006). I suspect that the majority in Boumediene implicitly con-
cluded that Congress, in exercising its power to regulate federal jurisdiction, cannot
run afoul of another provision of the Constitution (such as the Suspension Clause).
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1193, 1238-40 (2007) (predicting this line of reasoning).
A legislative withdrawal of jurisdiction, however, could almost always be chal-
lenged as violating some other constitutional provision. For instance, taking away the
federal courts' power to hear school-prayer cases would invariably lead to violations of
the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court, because elected
judges in states with deeply religious populations would be unlikely to enforce such
precedent vigorously. Therefore, Boumediene signals a retreat from the longstanding
(but erroneous) principle that Congress has absolute control over federal court
jurisdiction.
Although that development is welcome, the Court's specific holding is not. The
Suspension Clause does not extend habeas corpus protections to enemy aliens
outside of the United States, and even if it did, Congress in the DTA and MCA pro-
vided a constitutionally adequate substitute. See infra notes 334-42 and accompany-
ing text.
326 Boumediene casts doubt upon both the general principle of congressional con-
trol over federal jurisdiction and its specific application to habeas corpus in cases
dating back to Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-101 (1807), which estab-
lished that Article III courts lack jurisdiction to issue habeas writs absent legislative
authorization. See Pushaw, supra note 40, at 739, 745-54, 782-84, 802-03, 827-28,
831-33, 842-43 (analyzing Boilman in the broader context of congressional power
over the jurisdiction of federal courts, which prevents them from asserting "inherent"
nonstatutory authority to issue writs and to perform other tasks). For a thorough and
illuminating debate of the foregoing issues, see Choper & Yoo, supra note 235, at
1246-88
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Beginning with Marbury v. Madison,327 the Court has repeatedly
acknowledged that, under our system of separation of powers, the
Constitution limits judicial review to legal issues, but commits certain
political questions (such as military and foreign policy decisions,
appointments, and impeachment) for final resolution exclusively to
Congress or the President (or both) .328 In sharp contrast, Justice Ken-
nedy suggested that "separation of powers" required the Court to read
constitutional provisions, and the precedent interpreting them, as not
foreclosing a role for the judiciary because otherwise the political
branches might manipulate their unreviewable power.329
The Framers, however, believed that any such abuse should be
remedied by the political rather than the judicial process.330 To take
an example that would have seemed obvious to the Founders (and to
the Court until quite recently), Article II entrusts to the President the
power to determine the appropriate procedures for dealing with
enemy combatants, with any misbehavior rectified by Congress, the
voters, and international political pressure.331 Furthermore, the
Court itself sometimes abuses its power, as it did in Boumediene when it
interfered with such policy decisions on the pretext that they violated
the Suspension Clause.
In short, it is Kafkaesque for the majority to invoke "separation of
powers" as a justification for dismantling two bulwarks of that doc-
trine, congressional control over federal jurisdiction and the political
question doctrine. 332 Similar delusions of judicial grandeur impelled
the Court to ignore its venerable prudential rule of avoiding constitu-
tional questions until petitioners have exhausted available remedies,
which also reflects separation-of-powers concerns for limiting the judi-
ciary to its proper role.333
327 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
328 See id. at 164-71; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29, 237-38
(1993) (summarizing the political question doctrine, and holding that it precluded
judicial review of Article I's clauses granting Congress power to impeach and try exec-
utive and judicial officials). Justice Scalia argued that an "inflated notion of judicial
supremacy" led the majority to distort Marbury and its progeny by suggesting that
respecting jurisdictional limitations would deprive the Court of its power "to say what
the law is." See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2302-03 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
329 See supra note 264, 278 and accompanying text.
330 See Pushaw, supra note 18, at 444-53, 497-511 (citing numerous historical
sources).
331 See id. at 449-51.
332 For a description and critique of the Court's separation-of-powers rationale,
see supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
333 See supra Part II.D.1.
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Turning to the merits, Boumediene's central holding-that the
Constitution's guarantee of habeas corpus protected enemy aliens
who had been captured and confined outside of the United States'
sovereign territory-was not supported by a single citation to any
Anglo-American legal source.334 The Suspension Clause incorporated
English practice, and every relevant published British case and com-
mentary stated that the habeas writ did not extend to any foreigners
(even civilians) who had been detained beyond England's sovereign
dominion.3 3 5 The Supreme Court adopted this rule and specifically
applied it, in cases like Eisentrager, to alien enemy combatants
abroad. 336
Far from citing any authority to the contrary, law professors like
Ronald Dworkin and David Cole have commended the Boumediene
Court for ignoring precedent and instead relying upon general ideals
of liberty and human rights. 337 Indeed, the only colorable justifica-
tion for Boumediene has come from two historians, who recently
unearthed unpublished English materials suggesting a broad concep-
tion of habeas that allowed courts of a sovereign nation to determine
whether its officials had power to imprison a subject, regardless of his
334 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2303-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
335 The two towering figures of eighteenth-century English jurisprudence recog-
nized that the habeas writ did not apply extraterritorially. See R v. Cowle, (1759) 97
Eng. Rep. 587, 599-600 (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *78-79, *131. Likewise, the major English secondary sources set forth this princi-
ple as black-letter law. See, e.g., RICHARD SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAs CoRPus 188-91
(2d ed. 1989).
336 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see alsoJ. Andrew Kent, A Textual
and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007) (demonstrat-
ing that the Constitution's language, structure, and history reveal that it does not
confer judicially enforceable rights on aliens outside the United States); id. at 521-24
(illustrating this thesis by showing that the Constitution's habeas corpus writ does not
apply to noncitizens overseas).
337 See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 18 (conceding that "American law has never
before recognized that aliens imprisoned by the United States abroad have such
[habeas] rights," but saluting the Court for its "landmark change" of implementing
general principles of liberty); Cole, supra note 15, at 47-61 (acknowledging that Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion conflicts with longstanding case law, yet praising it as implic-
itly incorporating the emerging international law notion that courts can hold a nation
accountable for human rights violations against any persons within its control, even in
territory beyond its sovereign borders). Professor Katyal has maintained that the
MCA violates constitutional equality principles because its military commission proce-
dures and habeas-stripping provisions apply only to noncitizens. See Neal Katyal,
Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (2007). But see Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 50, at 2082-84 (explaining that the Constitution, as a compact among the
American people for their benefit and mutual advantage, fairly distinguishes between
citizens and aliens).
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location or status.338 These historians have not, however, set forth any
specific evidence that the drafters, ratifiers, or implementers of the Sus-
pension Clause understood its protections as reaching noncitizen
enemy aliens outside of the United States.33 9
338 Professors Halliday and White interpret the original meaning of the Suspen-
sion Clause based primarily on previously overlooked English court archives of
habeas corpus cases and other manuscripts. See Halliday & White, supra note 261, at
582, 588-93, 713 (describing these sources, and lamenting that scholars have ignored
them in favor of published documents such as case reports and treatises like Black-
stone's Commentaries). These authors argue that the common law habeas writ enabled
the King (through his judges) to vindicate his prerogative power by ensuring that his
officers had legal authority to detain someone, so that courts focused more on the
jailer than on the prisoner, whose rights and liberties, citizenship, and territorial loca-
tion were of far lesser concern. See id. at 583-87, 593-670, 700-01, 713. Conse-
quently, the habeas writ could run outside the geographical boundaries of the English
realm to anywhere in the King's dominions where he had a relationship with his sub-
jects, particularly through franchises that endowed companies with part of the royal
authority. See id. at 633-44. Indeed, in a few cases, courts even investigated the fac-
tual and legal basis for detaining "alien enemies" (i.e., subjects of a sovereign nation
at war with Britain) when they were present in the King's dominions, and a judicial
determination that they were in "open hostility" to the Crown would preclude habeas
relief. See id. at 587, 606-07.
Professors Halliday and White contend that Americans were familiar with this
English history, particularly because Parliament's suspension of the writ in America
between 1777 and 1783 (seemingly in violation of the colonists' rights as English sub-
jects) led to a deeper practical appreciation for the former practice of making habeas
corpus widely available and difficult to suspend. See id. at 628-33, 644-51, 670-99,
713-14. Thus, the authors assert that the Suspension Clause recognized that federal
courts had power to grant habeas writs according to substantive common law princi-
ples (i.e., concentrating on whether a federal government official had the legal power
to jail someone, not on the prisoner's status or location). See id. at 676-99.
339 Professors Halliday and White express caution in applying their historical anal-
ysis to different modem conditions, but nonetheless mention two implications of
their thesis for habeas corpus in the War on Terrorism. Id. at 586-87, 700-14. First,
the writ could run outside of the United States' sovereign territory if its officials were
holding a prisoner in custody. Id. at 586-87, 700, 705, 707. Second, for the same
reason, federal courts might well be able to inquire into the legality of the detention
of accused foreign terrorists, even though they are not necessarily analogous to tradi-
tional "alien enemies," at least to determine whether they were, in fact, enemy com-
batants. See id. at 587, 606-07, 705-14; see also Alexander, supra note 325, at 1200,
1232-38 (urging that the focus in habeas review should be on the constraints the
Constitution imposes on the government (wherever it operates), not on the rights the
Constitution confers on detainees who are noncitizens located outside of the United
States).
I have no basis to question the historical research of Professors Halliday and
White, because I have not gone to England to dig up and examine the relevant
unpublished documents. But neither did the drafters and ratifiers of our Constitu-
tion. Rather, the lawyers in that group relied most heavily on books that were readily
available. Most notably, Blackstone's Commentaries "became the bible of American
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Moreover, before the War on Terrorism, constitutional law schol-
ars of all ideological stripes agreed that Eisentrager and other cases had
precisely the meaning that Justice Scalia ascribed to them. 340 That
consensus indicates that personal opposition to the Bush administra-
tion's detainee policies, not adherence to existing law, explains the
position of the Boumediene majority and their academic apologists.
Finally, even assuming the Suspension Clause did apply to peti-
tioners, the Court has long recognized that habeas corpus is a flexible
remedy that can be tailored to meet different circumstances. 341
Therefore, the majority in Boumediene should have deferred to Con-
gress, which had formulated a comprehensive review scheme that
accounted for the unique problems posed by foreign suspected ter-
rorists while allowing them to challenge the legality of their detention
before an Article III court-the same purpose served by habeas. 342
Overall, the Court's conclusions on every major issue did not
reflect a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous legal sources, but
rather a manipulation of clear legal principles. Most importantly,
before Boumediene, one of the few ironclad rules in war powers juris-
prudence was that the Suspension Clause did not apply to alien
enemy combatants outside of America's sovereign territory. There-
fore, Congress had the power to remove all federal court jurisdiction
lawyers," had an unmatched influence on the Framers, and remained the most impor-
tant legal source in the United States for a century. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE
MYSTERaIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 1-2, 35 (1941). Blackstone clearly said that the writ
of habeas corpus did not apply to any foreigners detained outside of the King's sover-
eign dominions, much less alien enemies. See supra note 335. Lord Mansfield, the
greatest judge of the eighteenth century, expressed the same opinion in a well-known
reported case. See supra note 335. Even if Blackstone and Mansfield were wrong,
their legal views would likely have been accepted as correct by most Americans.
Admittedly, it is possible that the opposite was true-that Americans generally
disagreed with these English luminaries and instead shared the unspoken under-
standing of habeas uncovered by Professors Halliday and White. These scholars cite
no concrete evidence, however, that anyone in America ever stated or implied that
the Suspension Clause would protect foreign enemy combatants seized and held
beyond the United States' sovereign territory.
340 See, e.g., 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 6.13 (4th ed. 2007); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 300-01 (3d ed. 2000).
341 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
342 See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text; see also Gregory E. Maggs, Fore-
word: Symposium on the New Face of Armed Conflict: Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 971, 992-95 (2007) (making this argument in con-
cluding that the MCA was constitutional). But see Alexander, supra note 325, at
1199-232 (maintaining that the DTA and MCA do not supply a constitutionally ade-
quate substitute for habeas or allow for other meaningful alternative avenues ofjudi-
cial review).
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over cases involving Guantanamo detainees-and a fortiori could, as a
matter of legislative grace, grant them access to the D.C. Circuit fol-
lowed by review in the Supreme Court.
Indeed, Boumediene's lawlessness is so transparent that both dis-
senting Justices took the unusual course of flatly saying so. Justice
Scalia declared that "[w]hat drives today's decision is neither the
meaning of the Suspension Clause, nor the principles of our prece-
dents, but rather an inflated notion of judicial supremacy."343 Simi-
larly, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that "this decision is not really
about the detainees at all, but about control of federal policy regard-
ing enemy combatants. '344
Once again, it is telling that even Boumediene's staunchest aca-
demic boosters have not seriously disputed the dissenters' legal argu-
ments or tried to defend Justice Kennedy's opinion on its own terms.
Most notably, David Cole has admitted that the Court broke with its
settled case law by: (1) striking down congressional restrictions on fed-
eral court jurisdiction; (2) extending constitutional protections to
noncitizens outside United States territory during wartime; (3) hold-
ing that the Constitution's habeas writ applied to foreign enemies cap-
tured and detained abroad, contrary to Eisentrager, and (4)
invalidating a statute concerning the military passed by Congress and
signed by the President.345 Professor Cole instead justifies Boumediene
as reflecting the modern international law precept that courts can vin-
dicate the human rights of any persons against an offending nation
that exerts control over them, even in territory beyond its sovereign
borders. 346 If he is correct, however, then the majority should have
honestly set forth that legal reasoning instead of purporting to apply
domestic constitutional law.34 7
343 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
344 Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
345 See Cole, supra note 15, at 47-49, 53-54. Despite the Court's disregard for
established constitutional principles, Professor Cole lauds Boumediene as "a
profound-and in many respects surprising-defeat for the Bush administration in
the legal 'war on terror.' . . . [T]he courts will play a vital role in ensuring that the
rule of law applies to the ongoing struggle with Al Qaeda." Id. at 47.
346 See id. at 47, 50-53, 56-61; cf. Posner, supra note 293, at 23-25, 32-46 (con-
tending that Boumediene rests on an implicit theory of "judicial cosmopolitanism"-
that courts must protect the interests of noncitizens overseas-that conflicts with the
Constitution, which authorizes the political branches to negotiate with foreign
nations to achieve mutual advantages rather than allowing courts unilaterally to
bestow unreciprocated benefits on aliens).
347 Indeed, even some scholars who endorsed Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan pre-
dicted that the Court in Boumediene would be unlikely to invalidate the MCA because
of the absence of any legal authority to do so. See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Double-
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Although I agree with Professor Cole that the Court's stated legal
rationale is unpersuasive, I do not share his intuition that interna-
tional law drove its decision (although this law may have had some
effect). Rather, I submit that the Justices engaged in their usual pro-
cess of weighing many case-specific pragmatic, political, ideological,
and legal considerations.
b. A Realistic Assessment of Boumediene
The majority and dissent parted company in their discretionary
judgments about three key factors. First, Justices Kennedy, Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer believed that no military emergency
warranted the political branches' actions. The majority recognized
that some individuals fear that "terrorism continues to pose danger-
ous threats to us for years to come,' 348 but apparently thought those
fears were overblown because seven years had passed since September
11 without any terrorist attacks. Moreover, America had not been
placed on a continuous war footing, as in past armed conflicts. Under
these circumstances, the Court concluded that the United States
could afford to extend the privilege of habeas corpus to Guantanamo
detainees without compromising "the military mission. 3 49
The dissenters, on the other hand, viewed the government's
detention policies as part of its reasonable response to an urgent situa-
tion: "America is at war with radical Islamists" who have credibly
"threatened further attacks. '350 Justice Scalia deplored the majority's
conferral of new constitutional rights (and enhanced procedural pro-
tections) on suspected foreign terrorists because the government, in
applying less stringent procedural rules, had mistakenly released at
least thirty enemy combatants who later committed terrorist atroci-
ties.3 51 He warned that application of more demanding procedures
would result in the release of more terrorists, which "will almost cer-
tainly cause more Americans to be killed."35 2
Second, Justice Kennedy and his colleagues felt that denying peti-
tioners their constitutional privilege to seek the writ of habeas corpus
was particularly egregious:
Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and Hamdan, 80 TEMP. L. REv.
451, 483-86 (2007).
348 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 (majority opinion).
349 See id. at 2261.
350 See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351 See id. at 2294-95.
352 See id.
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Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and
the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation
of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to
consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.
. . . Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure,
few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as
the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Execu-
tive to imprison a person....
. . . The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and
remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be
reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the frame-
work of the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of
first importance, must be a part of that framework .... 353
The dissent emphasized that, on the contrary, the Founders had cho-
sen not to extend the privilege of habeas corpus to alien enemy com-
batants abroad. 354 Excluding this exceedingly tiny subset of prisoners,
as mandated by law, would have no effect on the writ's availability to
the millions who were entitled to seek it to protect their cherished
right to be free from unlawful restraint.
Third, the Court had no doubt that President Bush would obey
itsjudgment, as he had in Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan. ByJune 2008,
when Boumediene came down, Bush was a lame-duck President whose
popularity rating had hit all-time lows. 355 Thus, he did not have the
political strength to resist the decision, even if he had been inclined to
do so.3 56
353 Id. at 2277 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2244-47 (emphasizing the histori-
cal centrality of the habeas writ in safeguarding liberty); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extra-
territorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259, 273 (2009)
(arguing that the Court's "functional" approach took into account "a nontextual, nor-
mative valuation of the importance of the particular right under consideration," indi-
vidual liberty).
354 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293-94, 2303-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355 See supra notes 24, 27-29 and accompanying text.
356 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2008, at Al (quoting Bush's statement that "we'll abide by the court's
decision-that doesn't mean I have to agree with it"). Throughout his second term,
Bush persisted in asserting sweeping war powers as if America were in a continuing
military crisis similar to the Civil War or World War II, even though the carnage and
devastation were plainly not comparable. See supra notes 140-45, 224 and accompany-
ing text. Moreover, Bush never mobilized America to make great sacrifices for an all-
consuming military mission, as Lincoln and Roosevelt had done.
Another political problem arose from the unusual nature of the War on Terror-
ism, which defined success primarily in terms of preventing possible attacks (the
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The foregoing three factors counterbalanced a fourth that histor-
ically had been determinative: express congressional authorization of
the President's action.357 Boumediene thereby joined Hamdi as the
only cases in which the Court has invalidated a war policy approved by
both political branches. The most logical explanation for the major-
ity's willingness to defy Congress was the latter's historically low
approval rating.35 8
In sum, the Justices in Boumediene engaged in a complex calculus
that balanced a variety of factual, political, ideological, and practical
considerations. Accordingly, it would be a mistake to take the Court's
legal pronouncements at face value as though they set forth perma-
nent principles. 359
III. A CRITIcAL EXAMINATION OF THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES
According to most law professors and commentators, the Court
courageously enforced the Constitution and the "rule of law" in
Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene by striking down the unprece-
dented military policies of the Bush administration and its nefarious
allies in Congress, thereby requiring them to alter their antiterrorism
strategy.360 More generally, some scholars have argued that these
cases will trigger a seismic shift-that the Court henceforth will review
details of which could not be revealed for national security reasons) rather than con-
crete battlefield victories such as Gettysburg and D-Day. See Barron & Lederman,
Commander in Chief, Part I, supra note 19, at 713-15. Symbolically, it was much easier
for Bush to rally Americans in the wake of the September 11 attacks than in the shad-
owy realm of undisclosed threatened assaults that did not materialize.
In short, by 2008 President Bush did not have the political capital to assert broad
military powers and expect the Court to back down.
357 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Cole, supra note 15, at 47-48
(" [F]or the first time in its history the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law
enacted by Congress and signed by the president on an issue of military policy in a
time of armed conflict.").
358 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Furthermore, a Congress that had
shifted to a Democratic Party majority in the 2006 elections would be unlikely to resist
the Court's invalidation of the MCA, which had been crafted primarily by Republicans
shortly before they lost control of the House and Senate. See Devins, supra note 28, at
1593-94; see also Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional
Law: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. RE,. 281, 332-33 (2008) (making
this point and emphasizing that many members of Congress, during the debate over
the MCA, had repeatedly expressed their expectation that the Court would strike
down this statute).
359 See Posner, supra note 293, at 33 (suggesting that, in a future case, the Court
could "confine Boumediene to the facts, treating Guantanamo Bay as unique because
U.S. control is complete").
360 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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allegedly unlawful exercises of military power as rigorously as it does
domestic matters. 361 I am skeptical of the foregoing account, for
many reasons.
Most obviously, today's Justices do not appear to be uniquely cou-
rageous, as compared to their predecessors, in their willingness to
stand up to the President and Congress. On the contrary, the current
Justices have been far more deferential to the elected branches, and
far less likely to boldly create expansive constitutional rights, than
many of their forebears (most notably those on the Warren Court) 362
For example, over the past twenty years, the Court has halved its
docket and tended to decide cases on the narrowest possible legal
grounds, which has left many important constitutional questions open
for further democratic debate. 363 Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan seemed
to be consistent with that trend, as the majority issued limited rulings
that entrusted Congress and the President with ample discretion to
fashion particular procedures for enemy combatants. 364 Boumediene
pulled the rug out from under the political branches by nullifying
their handiwork through the fabrication of a right that had no foun-
dation in the Constitution's text, history, structure, and precedent.
Boumediene, then, simply imposed the will of five Justices who dis-
agreed personally and politically with the government's detainee poli-
cies. So did Rasul and Hamdan, which "interpreted" statutes to
contradict their clearly intended meanings and thereby necessitated
two congressional overrides. 365 It is ironic to praise such decisions as
vindicating the "rule of law," which requires courts to apply the legal
principles located in the Constitution, statutes, and cases even if doing
so leads to results that judges find distasteful.3 66
361 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 15; Dworkin, supra note 15, at 20-21.
362 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 6-8. The Warren Court revolutionized constitu-
tional law in areas such as criminal procedure, equal protection, and substantive due
process/privacy. See RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Consti-
tutional Common Law, 31 IAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 522, 529-31, 577-78, 589
(2008). The Burger and Rehnquist Courts struggled to apply and modify this prece-
dent on a case-by-case basis and occasionally issued novel decisions like Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which created a due process right of privacy for con-
senting adults to engage in sodomy. See id. at 578-84.
363 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
364 See supra Part II.A-C.
365 See supra notes 148-66, 185-208, 212-14, 236-39 and accompanying text.
366 See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Tushnet, supa note 112, at
1472 (ridiculing the Hamdan Court's "paean to the Rule of Law" and observing that
"if Hamdan is a triumph of the Rule of Law, so must be the Military Commissions
Act").
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Furthermore, critics who charged that the Bush administration's
military policies were unparalleled in their harshness don't know
much about history. Most pertinently, Lincoln suspended habeas
corpus generally, 367 whereas Bush left the writ intact except for a few
hundred alien enemy combatants in Guantanamo (who still enjoyed
multilayered military and judicial review of their claims, unlike their
historical counterparts). 368 Lincoln also asserted independent power
to try war crimes by military commissions and execute those found
guilty, as did Roosevelt-both with the Court's blessing.3 69 Bush fol-
lowed their lead, except he did not impose capital punishment. Nor
did he emulate other drastic wartime measures, such as Lincoln's and
Roosevelt's seizures of private property, Wilson's criminal prosecu-
tions of antiwar speakers, and Roosevelt's forcible relocation of ethnic
minorities.3 70
In short, President Bush invoked longstanding executive practice
to justify detaining foreign enemy combatants, not allowing them to
contest their status in habeas proceedings, and ordering their trial by
military commission. Although legal scholars and pundits congratu-
lated the Court for dealing the Bush administration a string of suppos-
edly stunning defeats,3 71 the President managed to do what he
believed necessary to protect national security for all but the last few
months of an eight-year tenure. The Court did not cow the political
branches into radically changing their basic antiterrorism policies.372
Thus, a realist would conclude that the Court, in asserting increased
authority to review the exercise of war powers, actually highlighted its
institutional weakness in this area.
History also suggests the unlikelihood that Hamdi, Rasul,
Hamdan, and Boumediene are the vanguard of an enduring switch to
aggressive judicial review to protect individual rights during wartime.
Many scholars have approvingly cited Justice Kennedy's majestic dec-
laration that "[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and
remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be
reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the frame-
367 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
368 See supra notes 168-79, 185, 236-38, 300-06, 313-18 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 61-63, 75-78 and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 56-57, 74, 79-83 and accompanying text.
371 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
372 See Rahdert, supra note 347, at 454-56, 480, 487-88 (concluding that the Bush
administration's ability to persuade Congress to enact the DTA and MCA illustrate
that the Court's "enemy combatant" decisions did not have much real impact on the
conduct of the War on Terrorism).
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work of the law." 373 This rhetoric echoes the words of Ex parte Milli-
gan: "The Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all clas-
ses of men, at all times, and under all circumstances." 374 But recall
that the Court in Milligan confessed that it had not followed the Con-
stitution during the Civil War 3 7 5 and that its promise to enforce con-
stitutional law "at all times" was broken within a year.3 76 Cases like Ex
parte Quifin similarly reveal that, contrary to Justice Kennedy's wishful
thinking, the Court during "extraordinary times" often does not delib-
eratively interpret the Constitution and laws in a way that best recon-
ciles liberty and security.3 7 7 It is naive to suppose that our current
Justices are so uniquely brave and noble that they will be immune to
similar pressures-especially if a crisis were to arise on a par with the
Civil War or World War 11.378
Indeed, history teaches that, during wartime, judicial discretion
has been the better part of valor. The Court has always showed much
greater deference to the government (sometimes bordering on abdi-
cation) when it has exercised military powers than when it has regu-
lated domestic affairs. The precise degree of deference has reflected
the factual, legal, and political circumstances of each case, although
certain considerations have emerged as especially important-the
severity of the crisis, the President's political strength, approval of his
actions by Congress, and the nature of the legal rights at stake.37 9
These factors have invariably persuaded the Court to yield to a power-
ful President like Lincoln or Roosevelt who, with the support of Con-
gress, responded to a pressing threat to national security.38 0 Even in
373 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008); see also Chemerinsky, supra
note 15 (endorsing justice Kennedy's statement).
374 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
375 See id. at 109.
376 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the Court
capitulated to the constitutionally dubious actions of the powerful Reconstruction
Congress).
377 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
378 Other scholars share my skepticism. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1041-44 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 623-25 (2003); Mark Tushnet,
Defending Korematsu ? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 273,
304-05.
379 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
380 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-20, 223-24 (1944); The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665-82 (1862); see also supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text (discussing Korematsu); supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text
(analyzing The Prize Cases).
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conflicts less serious than the Civil War and World War II, the Justices
typically have respected the President's judgment that a particular mil-
itary measure had to be implemented. 381 The Court has invalidated
such laws only in relatively rare cases like Milligan38 2 and Youngs-
town, 3 83 when a wildly unpopular President like Johnson or Truman
independently took actions that struck a majority of Justices as unnec-
essary and offensive to fundamental legal rights.384
I suspect that, in time, the "enemy combatant" decisions will be
placed into this final category. A group of Justices pragmatically
exploited a golden opportunity to announce new legal limits on the
President when his approval ratings had hit Truman-like lows, the
immediate post-September 11 crisis had long since faded and hence
Bush's initial get-tough approach seemed too severe, and individual
liberty in its most basic form was at stake. The only sharp break from
the past was the Court's willingness to thwart executive action that
enjoyed the approval of Congress, either expressly (Hamdi and
Boumediene) or implicitly (Rasul and Hamdan). The most plausible
reason for this newfound aggressiveness was Congress's own histori-
cally abysmal approval ratings. Moreover, in Boumediene the Court
had the added advantages that Bush was a lame duck, that the new
President would likely alter detainee policy and perhaps shut down
Guantanamo, and that economic woes had displaced terrorism as the
voters' chief concern. 385
I anticipate, however, that when the next military crisis rears its
ugly head, the Court will uphold whatever policies the President
deems prudent to meet the danger. Fortunately, the Court could sup-
port such a deferential judgment by relying upon the precedent that
it took such pains to distinguish rather than overrule, such as Eisen-
trager, Quirin, and The Prize Cases.386
CONCLUSION
The War on Terrorism has aroused such powerful emotions on
both sides of the debate that it becomes easy to ascribe to Supreme
Court decisions a significance that they do not actually possess. On
the one hand, the liberal dream that Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and
381 See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
382 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 134-36 (1866); see also supra notes
96-100 and accompanying text (describing Milligan).
383 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952); see
also supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text (examining Youngstown).
384 See supra notes 96-100, 104-13 and accompanying text.
385 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
386 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2257-58, 2270-71 (2008).
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Boumediene have ushered in a new age of heroic judicial defense of
constitutional rights during wartime will probably not come true. On
the other hand, the conservative nightmare voiced by Justice Scalia
and his followers that the federal judiciary will forever be embroiled in
overseeing military policy (for example, through millions of habeas
corpus proceedings brought by captured soldiers) also seems overly
dramatic.
In the midst of such a heated controversy, history sheds cold but
bright light. America has experienced cycles before in which the
Court asserted broad authority to review the exercise of war powers.
But that approach has never lasted. Rather, the Justices typically have
exercised their discretion to yield to the political branches in military
matters, often because they had no other realistic choice. This history
suggests that the "enemy combatant" cases will not have a profound
lasting impact.
2052 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:5
